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1 The sound of discord  
Particularly in the last thirty years, the rapid blooming of technology and communications 
opened new roads for commerce
1
, as well as the exchange of ideas and culture. The 
internet, with its ubiquity and potential to serve as a vehicle to widespread information and 
commercial and entertainment offers, became a regular household- and work tool for 
consumers, businesses and governments alike
2
.  
Yet to speak merely of the internet in today‟s communications revolution would be 
insufficient. In today‟s fast developing and technologically complex communications 
market, new products and services
3
 are continuously introduced, often in converged or 
bundled packages; traditional players extend their activities into new sectors, while new 
players enter the market, and the provision of services across borders becomes common 
place. This, in turn, has a profound effect in consumers‟ communications needs and 
behaviours, diversifying and changing them, and often presenting new regulatory 
challenges.  
In parallel, that same metamorphosis of information and communications technology (ICT) 
brought about a greater availability and transparency of information: the publication, 
dissemination and accessing of information by and to a “global forum of users”, over 
“global networks”4. On the governmental side, consumer friendly policies played a 
noteworthy role in encouraging the use of new technologies and in promoting the 
development of e-commerce. Such policies imposed, in several jurisdictions, the disclosure 
of a minimum content of information in communications services provision contracts, 
                                                 
1
 The paradigmatic example is e-commerce, though business models keep evolving in face of new market 
structures and social behaviours. See Laudon et. alias (2008).  
2
 Contrastingly, the digital divide persists: http://www.itu.int/wsis/tunis/newsroom/stats/). 
3
 Potentially, even previously unregulated services. 
4
 Wikipedia, social forums and blogs, content-sharing services (YouTube, Photobucket), etc. 
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reinforced consumer rights and privacy and data protection, and mandated the publishing of 
comparative data and statistics
5
.  
Nonetheless, this increased interaction and trade also propitiated a boost in litigation
6
. This 
isn‟t to say that historically litigation regarding trading or communication services didn‟t 
already exist. However the growing complexity of technologies and services available, of 
their provision contracts, and the globalisation introduced by the internet, impelled the 
emergence of new problems and disputes, especially on a consumer society
7
 setting
8
.  
This partly laid bare the inadequacy of a more process-oriented judiciary system
9
, with 
traditional (physical) evidence and adversary processes
10
, to deal speedy and efficiently 
with electronic communications services (hereafter, ECS) market disputes, where decisions 
often need to be timely, so as not to render their effects useless.  
Naturally then, the interest in alternative dispute resolution (hereafter, ADR) methods is to 
be understood. These are, in essence, techniques used for the solving of conflicts outside of 
traditional courts. They tend to enjoy a less formal and rigid process, which renders them 
potentially faster, less expensive and more flexible in achieving a solution. Thus ADR is 
likelier to appeal to parties and involve them more actively in a search for consensus. 
Traditionally, ADR is divided into three main types of proceedings, according to the level 
                                                 
5
  Within the European Union, e.g. Directive 97/7/EC on the protection of Consumers in Respect of Distance 
Contracts (the Distance Contracts Directive), Directive 93/13/EEC on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Directive, Directive 2000/13/EC on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services (the E-commerce 
Directive) and Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free Movement of such Data (Data Protection Directive). 
6
 Bonnet et alias (2004), p.1.  
7
 A human society strongly influenced and orientated by consumerism. Dictionary of Sociology, Oxford 
University Press, Third Edition, 2005. 
8
 Turel and Yuan (2010), p.425. In Portugal, the civil procedural code underwent changes to allow for 
speedier and simpler proceedings for debt recovery, partly impelled by the need for mobile operators to bring 
collective action against thousands of payment failure cases. 
See http://www.pgdlisboa.pt/pgdl/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?nid=574&tabela=leis (Decree-Law no. 
269/98, 1 September). 
9
 There are exceptions, such as simplified proceedings, to deal with e.g. small claims. E.g., the European 
order for payment procedure enacted by Regulation (EC) no 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 12 December 2006. 
10
 Notwithstanding the benefits brought by the creation of special consumer tribunals, by legislative or 
jurisdictional reforms aiming at simplification and speeding of Court proceedings, or by a progressive 
computerisation of legal systems and Court services.  
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of volition retained by the parties throughout and the formality involved: negotiation, 
mediation and arbitration (the last one implying already an adjudicatory decision by a third 
party; it is, of the three, the closest to the formality of a traditional judiciary procedure). 
Nowadays, however, there can also be found hybrid models, enclosing characteristics of 
more than one of these models or even with innovative aspects
11
.  
Though ADR is not free of shortcomings
12
, namely concerning the enforceability of its 
decisions and its susceptibility to dilatory and good faith abuse, it can play a pivotal role in 
protecting business and consumer interests, while unburdening the judiciary system. 
“Ultimately, the test of successful dispute resolution (...) is its impact on investment, 
growth, and development in the sector.”  It needs “to be as speedy as the networks and 
technologies (it) serve(s)”13.  
With this background in mind, the present paper focuses on the level and type of litigation 
found within the settings of a developed country‟s ECS market and attempts to shed some 
light into its causes. Then, drawing lessons from the growing body of commentary 
regarding ADR and consumer protection in a Digital Age, it strives to put forward concrete 
orientations towards a model of ADR that fulfils the aims of faster but fair and more cost-
effective access to justice. Thus framed, this paper will also evaluate the role regulators (or 
other entities) must or should play in such a model and use as reference a case study and 
examples of employed ADR mechanisms.  
It is difficult to assess, at this stage of development of the ECS market‟s dispute settlement 
mechanisms, whether it is legitimate to sketch a proposal of ADR to serve as future 
reference, and even more so when taking on board a perspective of eventual harmonisation. 
National markets‟ characteristics, experiences and business cultures weigh heavily in the 
choices made both on a regulatory and industry level. Nonetheless, it may be possible, 
based on the documented experience of ADR in this market‟s context, to discover 
assumptions and patterns that need revising or that present especially positive results.  
                                                 
11
 Amongst other included literature: ITU (2004), p.22. 
12
 Op.cit. 
13
 Ibidem, p.v and x. 
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1.1 Object  
Though other types of disputes are present in an ECS market
14
, this paper‟s perspective will 
be one of B2C (business-to-consumer): customer disputes. Here the task of identifying 
trends in dispute resolution, as well as patterns in customer behaviour and expectations 
(potentiating a conflict stage), may be facilitated by the supple information available, for 
example by the hand of communications regulators or international organisations, 
consolidating experiences. The model to be proposed must be capable of satisfying both 
businesses and consumers. 
Importantly, as well, it'll be assumed the reader has a general understanding of the concept 
of ADR and of its typical forms. Therefore, this paper will only undergo the study of ADR 
models insofar as they prove helpful composing a functional ADR structure. Some 
comparative analysis will be carried out, especially among employed ADR systems, but it 
will not be a main feature. This applies equally to electronic ADR (e-ADR) or online 
dispute resolution (ODR) methods. 
Limiting this paper to the ECS market, in turn, imposes choices on its legal scope and 
which services to contemplate. On the first note, the perspective will be markedly 
European, taking the European Union (hereafter EU) internal market and law as key points 
of reference, while the case study focuses on the Portuguese experience. On the second 
point, it will not cover services that are not in itself communications services but merely 
depend on these as a vehicle for their providing or transmission. A different approach 
would require consideration to be given to all sorts of activities and markets, subject to 
different legal frameworks and different supervision and sanctioning authorities
15
.  
                                                 
14
 Ibidem, p. vii. 
15
 This paper would forcibly cover varied content providing, even by non-operators; the commercial, 
advertising or entertainment activities offered through ICT infrastructures or services; the publication and/or 
distribution of intellectual property goods, and even privacy and personal data related issues, amongst others. 
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Similarly intermediary liability will not be comprehended. In EU Law, intermediary 
liability found what seems a balanced solution
16
, likely accounting for the residual nature 
of conflicts between Communications Services Providers (hereafter, CSP) and consumers 
on the subject.  
Conversely, the general panoply of services commonly offered by CSP is included, insofar 
as they are accessory to the provision of communication services or are an integrant part of 
the contract. By “accessory” is meant the providing, directly or indirectly, by the operator 
of a product or service that enables the use of the communications service, but doesn‟t 
constitute the main contracted service. For instance, customer service and the purchase of 
equipment or the equipment‟s malfunctioning will be of interest, but the sale of magazines 
or tickets to events, even if organised or sponsored by a CSP, will not. Likewise an offer 
connected to the entering or changing of a contract will be of relevance. This is done for 
two reasons:  
1) as the case study will illustrate, there is a need to not only make ADR mechanisms 
more agile, but also the distribution of positive competence to address complaints; and  
2) because very specialised ADR systems require multiple resources to analyse and break 
down complaints according to jurisdiction, possibly preventing an integrated treatment 
of its issues and leading to case rework; they may cause conflicts of negative 
competence, and may alienate complainants. If for a vast number of complainants it 
feels instinctive to address one particular ADR system, it is worthwhile striving to 
comprehend why.   
Finally, this paper shall exclude postal services. This is not to say the conclusions and 
proposed solution cannot equally apply with the necessary adaptations, but for 
simplification reasons they shall be left out.  
                                                 
16
 Most relevantly, see E-Commerce Directive, Articles 12 to 15.  
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1.2 Method  
In view of its practical orientation, this paper‟s methodology will be cross-disciplinary, 
though in the beginning it will tend towards a legal approach. The jurisprudential element 
will be almost absent, except where relevant to stress benchmarking practices or the 
complementary role of ADR towards the judicial system.   
Commencing with an overview of the legal framework of EU communications market, it is 
submitted that current B2C complaint management and settlement have made little 
progress in shifting from traditional legal responses. While consumer rights are 
strengthened and ADR regulation increased
17
, a concerted reorganisation and redistribution 
of responsibilities which effectively improves access to justice has failed to come about. 
Thus, after analysing current shortcomings (Section 2), this paper discusses the need to 
focus on consumers first, in order to understand and respond to their concerns and 
expectations. Then, it looks at good governance principles and the engagement of 
technology, allied with a concerted participation by market stakeholders, to motion a 
system that is holistic in its approach to justice (Sections 3 and 5). This ADR system 
proposes to overcome present inefficiencies through structural and procedural choices 
regarding its configuration.  
Aiming at justifying the suggested model, Section 5 also comprises a comparative analysis 
of ADR systems or complaint schemes already employed,  most noticeably those by the 
English and German National Regulatory Authorities (hereafter, NRA):  the Office of 
Communications (Ofcom) and the Regulierungsbehörde für Telekommunikation und Post 
(RegTP) (of the Bundesnetzagentur/Federal Network Agency), respectively. 
The Portuguese case study illustrates many of the points discussed and allows for further 
conclusions (Section 4). Finally, and to ensure the system‟s sustainability, a broader plan is 
                                                 
17
 From a legal standpoint, besides legislation mentioned throughout, see e.g. Directive 2008/52/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008, on Certain Aspects of Mediation in Civil and 
Commercial Matters. On the academic side, both Cortés (both, 2010) and Schiavetta (2008) recently defended 
dissertations anchored on regulatory development of ADR. 
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suggested, focusing on policy certainty, transparency and education as contributors to 
dispute prevention (Section 6).  
1.3 Terminology 
Some concepts were so far used interchangeably, with more or less terminological 
precision. “ADR system”, “mechanism”, “procedure” and “scheme” have referred to the 
same reality, despite a legal mechanism being a part of the system or scheme it is inserted 
in. These concepts will continue to be used as synonyms, as no (sensible) misleading arises. 
Hence, ADR will mean any structures in place to deal with complaints or requests 
presented by consumers or electronic communications services end-users, with the 
intention of seeking redress, changing a state of affairs or constituting, demanding or 
stopping the exercise of a right, outside and as an alternative to Court litigation (without 
prejudice of review or appeal). In this broad sense, the term includes internal dispute 
resolution (IDR), though IDR will be used when referring to internal mechanisms alone.   
Similarly, “consumer” and “end-user” may be used alternatively, despite their different 
scopes. The notion of “consumer” enjoys a reasonably harmonised definition throughout 
Community legislation as “any natural person who...” uses or requests a publicly available 
electronic communications service or acts for purposes “which are outside his or her trade, 
business or profession”18. “End-user”, on the other hand, corresponds to the meaning given 
in Framework Directive, Article 2(n)
19: “a user not providing public communications 
networks or publicly available electronic communications services”.  
The definition of “end-user” encompasses a reality that escapes the quoted notion of 
“consumer”: legal persons that use or request a publicly available electronic 
communications service while acting outside their scope of activity. Being hard to justify 
upfront a numeric limit to distinguish between which legal persons to incorporate in a B2C 
                                                 
18
 Framework Directive, Article 2(i) (Directive 2002/21/EC); E-Commerce Directive, Article 2(e); Distance 
Contracts Directive, Article 2(2), or Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive, Article 2(b), e.g. 
19
 Ibidem.  
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context, as opposed to a business-to-business (B2B) one
20
, a juridical criterion is proposed: 
for this paper‟s purposes, end-user comprises natural and legal persons whose ECS 
contracts correspond to standard contracts, i.e., where no bargain power existed to 
negotiate those clauses, in entering into contract. It is a position in harmony with the 
rationale behind, namely, Universal Service Directive‟s Article 34(1)21, final statement. 
The term “subscriber”, as drawn in Framework Directive, Article 2(k), may be used to 
stress the contractual relationship. The term “user”, if resorted to, will simply refer to the 
one of end-user, with no correspondence to its legal definition. 
“Electronic communications services” will correspond to that stated under Framework 
Directive, Article 2(c), and “communications service provider” will stand for any natural or 
legal person providing ECS in the referred sense. National Regulatory Authority will have 
the meaning attributed by Article 2(g), also of the Framework Directive.    
To conclude, a definition of “complaint” is essential and the one proposed by the 
International Standard Organisation in ISO 10002:2004 (Quality Management – Customer 
Satisfaction – Guidelines for Complaints Handling in Organisations) will serve as 
reference: “Complaint means an expression of dissatisfaction made to” a CSP related to its 
“products or services, or the complaints-handling process itself, where a response or 
resolution is explicitly or implicitly expected”22 (by a complainant/claimant/end-
user/consumer). The Australian Standard AS ISO 10002 – 2006 “Customer Satisfaction – 
Guidelines for complaints handling in organisations”, issued by Standards Australia in 
April 2006, is also taken into account. It should merely be added that faults/omissions by 
undertakings are comprised, as they too originate dissatisfaction. Conflicts will, therefore, 
be understood as prima facie incompatibilities between the interests or perceptions of 
                                                 
20
 In the UK, Ofcom comprises “companies with 10 or fewer employees” in its consumer protection policies: 
namely, Ofcom (2009), Point 4.6. In Portugal, only natural persons are considered end-users for purposes of 
consumer disputes handled by the Portuguese communications NRA. 
21
 Directive 2002/22/EC. 
22
 http://www.iso.org/iso/iso_catalogue/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=35539 
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opposing parties, requiring a process of management of that incompatibility in order to find 
a compromise or a solution favourable to one or both parties.  
  
  10 
 
2 The orchestra: the interplaying of EU instruments and national law 
regarding B2C disputes in the electronic communications sector 
 
From tariffs transparency to clearer contractual terms, the promotion of quality standards, 
the decreasing of barriers for disabled users and economically disadvantaged consumers, or 
the stimulation of IDR adoption by CSP, to name a few, the measures and initiatives to 
kindle consumer confidence while ensuring them maximum protection and benefits on 
using ECS, have been hot topics in policy-making agendas, both on the international and 
national levels
23
. 
Nonetheless the type and degree of consumer protection within a communications market 
vary on a national stage. The framework found in developed countries typically 
encompasses three major categories – consumer law, information and communications 
technology law and competition law – and additionally comprises co- and self-regulation 
initiatives. However in developing countries some of these may be lacking
24
. This may 
include the absence, for example, of specific telecommunications legislation and of an 
independent regulatory authority to oversee the sector, represent consumer interests or 
address their concerns and complaints. 
                                                 
23
 E.g., by the ITU and The World Bank, amongst other initiatives, the “Global Seminar on Quality of 
Service and Consumer Protection”, held in 2006; by the PT IRG End-Users, the 1st meeting on 
“Transparency of Retail Tariffs Project”, in Norway, 2008; the  recent public consultation by the European 
Union‟s Consumers Affairs on a draft harmonised methodology for classifying and reporting consumer 
complaints and enquiries (http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/strategy/complaints_en.htm); by the English NRA, 
Ofcom, the Consultation on Protecting Consumers on the Mis-selling of Mobile Telecommunications 
Services (http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/mobmisselling/mobmisselling.pdf). 
24
 Southwood (2006), p.9 ss. 
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Yet even when contemplating the “paradigm” of a communications market in a developed 
country, the adequacy and effectiveness of the body of rules in place must be questioned in 
face of changing consumer patterns, to ascertain consumer safeguard is sustained. One of 
the elements that can serve as a barometer is the type and level of litigation registered 
within a given communications market and the efficacy felt regarding the settlement of 
disputes.  
Indeed, judicial procedures may prove too lengthy, expensive and lack the technical 
expertise
25
 to adequately deal with disputes arising from a swift changing market as that of 
communications. Even when considering simple contractual conflicts related to the 
provision of services, it is unlikely these can be dealt with in a reasonable timeframe. In 
addition, cost-benefit considerations may deter consumers from seeking justice in Court
26
. 
It becomes necessary to look for alternative solutions
27
.  
On the international level, the intertwining of the „official and unofficial sectors‟ regarding 
ICT dispute resolution is considerably wide-ranging
28
, especially in relation to consumer 
disputes
29
.  In the EU, Member-States are to ensure their legislation “does not hamper the 
use of out-of-court schemes”30, “including appropriate electronic means”31. Such schemes 
must be transparent, non-discriminatory, simple and inexpensive, and should enable 
“disputes to be settled fairly and promptly”32. Furthermore they may adopt reimbursement 
and/or compensation systems
33
. This adoption may be done by associating the 
reimbursement/compensation with consumer rights or by imposing the implementation of 
                                                 
25
 Especially on matters involving great technical detail and technological proficiency. Cortés, 
“Developing...” (2010), p.3. 
26
 Ibidem, p.2-3. 
27 
Also OECD (2010), p.14. “The issue is not whether a contract can be enforced but rather the cost of the 
various enforcement mechanisms and their efficacy in improving confidence between contracting parties. To 
be effective, the costs of enforcement must not outweigh the gains achieved from increased contractual 
commitment.”  
28
 ITU (2004), p.63ss. 
29
 Ibidem.  
30
 Ibidem, Article 34(3); E-Commerce Directive, Article 17(1). 
31
 E-Commerce Directive, ibidem. 
32
 Universal Service Directive, Article 34(1). Or, in the wording of E-Commerce Directive, recital 51, their 
“functioning  [should be] genuinely and effectively possible in law and in practice, even across borders”. 
33
 Universal Service Directive, Article 34(1). 
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such mechanisms within B2C ADR procedures. Member-States are therefore encouraged to 
foster impartial out-of-court initiatives and are given significant discretion in defining the 
roles and interrelation between judicial and other governmental authorities and independent 
and/or private ADR systems. 
For their part, under EU law, communications NRAs presently pursue their consumer 
protection duties through three main gateways, set ex ante to the emergence of conflicts
34
:  
A) They promote the availability and transparency of information and publish statistical 
and comparative data to raise consumer awareness.  
B) They incentivise the adoption or adherence to ADR systems by CSP and consumers, as 
well as soft law initiatives (e.g., codes of conduct).  
C) They complement legislation by issuing guidelines, recommendations and decisions; 
resort to benchmarking; hold open public consultations and keep statistics, for policy-
making guidance purposes. 
Furthermore NRAs oversee the market and compliance with the sector‟s rules by CSP and 
other relevant stakeholders. To that end, they can namely conduct inquiries and begin 
administrative procedures. These may culminate in the application of sanctions, in case of 
violation of statutory or regulatory obligations by providers. Additionally, they can, within 
specific cases, mediate conflicts between undertakings or issue binding decisions at either 
of the parties‟ request (for example, between operators regarding network access35).  
In practice, this means NRAs fulfil a double role. A purely vertical role, regarding the 
exercise of their general functions (regulation and oversight). And one with horizontal 
implications, stemming from that first vinculum: mediation of conflicts between 
undertakings. This sets end-users aside. Only through NRAs‟ decisions and regulations 
                                                 
34
 Framework Directive, recital 13 and Article 8. Most specification of NRAs‟ duties and obligations results 
from individual Member-State regulation, in fulfillment of transposed norms (Ibidem, Article 3(4)). 
35
 Framework Directive, Article 20, and Access Directive, Article 5(4). Also, Framework Directive, Article 
21, on cross-border disputes.  
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resulting in obligations for CSP, may there be added safeguards or rights for consumers
36
. 
Yet these are enforceable on a contractual level only, being therefore deprived of the 
possibility of enactment through official mechanisms at the disposal of NRAs. What‟s 
more, because contractual breach falls under private law, the consumer‟s problem will not 
be dealt with together with public issues raised in a complaint received by NRAs. There are 
no (immediate) rewards or remedies for end-users within such proceedings.  
This is not to say that particular NRAs cannot have assumed, in their statutes or in 
fulfilment of statutory duties, a role closer to that of a mediator or arbitrator in regards to 
(some) consumer conflicts
37
. Yet such a duty does not originate directly from EU 
legislation
38
.  
NRAs‟ powers are bounded by the conferred powers principle and speciality principle39. To 
extract a duty for NRAs to assume the role of “consumer dispute adjudicator or mediator” 
from general (and programmatic
40
) rules on consumer protection, in respect to the 
contractual relationship between undertakings and end-users, would be an ultra vires 
interpretation.  
In a period where consumer protection and fundamental rights have such a growing 
importance in EU legislation
41
, it  may be asked whether this is desirable or what changes 
                                                 
36
 E.g., Ofcom (2008) “Review on Additional Charges...”, or ICP-ANACOM‟s Decision on not billing 
consumers on voicemail calls up to 5 seconds (Deliberation of 16 May 2002). 
37
 See Section 5.4. 
38
When compared with the redaction of Framework Directive, Article 8, Articles 20 and 21of the same 
Directive provide a legislative argument supporting the delimitation of NRAs‟ powers to disputes between 
undertakings. While in Articles 20 and 21 the Community legislator opted to expressly regulate the need and 
general terms of the procedures to adopt on a national level regarding disputes between undertakings, on 
Article 8(b) there is merely a general and programmatic obligation for NRAs to ensure the availability of 
ADR procedures, carried out by bodies independent of the parties involved, and inserted under the epigraph 
“Policy objectives and regulatory principles”. Also corroborating this reasoning, in Universal Service 
Directive, Article 34, the literal element points to an obligation of Member-States (and not necessarily of 
NRAs) to ensure the existence and creation of such procedures.    
39
 Embodied in EU Treaty, Article 5(1) and (2) and Article 13(2). 
40
 Rules that provide guidelines for the legislator (lato sensus) on what values and goals should be promoted 
or protected.  
41
 Namely Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, Articles 12 and 169; Framework Directive, Article 8(4)(b), or 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 38. 
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are compatible with those principles, in order to reinforce consumer protection and 
effective access to justice.  
2.1 Alternative roads? 
A more authoritative approach could be taken, for example, with the EU assuming a 
perspective of strong regulation and leaving the implementation and oversight of 
regulations up to the administrative mechanisms of Member-States, namely the NRAs. 
Oppositely, the system could rely on self-regulation, best practices and codes of conduct, 
trusting competition to ensure fairness, the optimisation of offers and prices (and thus of 
choice and benefits for consumers) and the setting up of functional and speedy ADR, 
motivated by the dictum that a satisfied client does not change operator(s).  
2.1.1 The hard law approach 
In the first case, there is a notorious disregard for the principles of conferred powers and 
subsidiarity
42
. The EU would have to reach the conclusion that the demands of building the 
internal market required a stronger intervention and that Member-States were not capable 
of reaching the desired results, on their own or by way of a coordinated initiative (co-
regulation) with the industry players or the EU itself. It would represent a clear departure 
from current practices of deregulation, simplification and differentiation in policy and rule-
making. It would be disproportional to the objectives pursued
43
.  
From an industry perspective, such an over-prescriptive system would likely deter 
investment and development, raise administrative costs for CSPs, and consequently for 
consumers, and possibly levy disproportionate burdens on the companies. Moreover, strong 
statutory interventions may prove insufficiently flexible, react too slowly to the market‟s 
needs and disregard or lack industry expertise. 
                                                 
42
 EU Treaty, Article 5. 
43
 Ibidem, Article 5 (1) and (4). 
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2.1.2 The soft law approach 
In the second case, the risk would be in sacrificing consumer interests and protection for 
the sake of incentivising the market‟s growth and competition, without ensuring that free 
and fair competition had a healthy and solid environment to be sustained by. In fact, the 
market within the Community space as it is today seems to corroborate that an attempt to 
leave the handling of B2C disputes to the market‟s own devices would not be entirely 
successful.  
Today‟s Community policy-making already puts a growing emphasis on self-regulation 
and bottom-up decisions, leaving a supple range of solutions at the disposal of Member-
States. It gives voice to a policy of unification and cohesion through a differentiated 
approach, which may propitiate a stable and continuous development of the internal market 
and economy, as well as social wellbeing. Because Member-States have a better perception 
of their home markets and their specificities, they‟re believed to be in a better position to 
address market failures. In turn, Member-States attempt to engage the market‟s players44 in 
the drawing of regulatory solutions, as consensus and the recognition of common interests 
have the potential to bring forth stable, proportionate and effective measures.   
If at times industry-led approaches have shown to be a reaction to a threat of statutory 
intervention
45
, industry incentives still won‟t always match consumers‟ interests. The 
industry or individual companies may be resilient to act in a way that is adequate to reach 
public objectives, requiring at least some degree of statutory intervention to ensure those 
objectives are met. This in itself justifies the need for top-down decisions.  
Moreover there are needs the market only with difficulty will address, such as those of 
economically disadvantaged families, special needs groups
46
 or simply the common user‟s 
lack of bargaining power on entering into contract. Similarly, despite of all the information 
available, consumers won‟t always make the optimal choice. Not only is the consumer‟s 
                                                 
44
 E.g., CSPs, consumer organisations, trade associations, the public, academics, amongst others. 
45
 Ofcom, “Identifying...” (2008), paragr. 2.24. 
46
 Disabled users, elderly citizens, or minors, for instance. 
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ability to understand all aspects of the functioning of the market and available services a 
fallacy, as it is to believe in the consumer‟s willingness to choose the option which will 
grant him or her
47
 the most benefits every time. Marketing, peer pressure and general 
opinion are just a few of the factors that jumble the decision-making process.  
Thus, an evaluation of the necessary balance between different regulatory approaches is 
essential in each case. Regulatory solutions evolve over time and, at this point of 
development of the market, State regulation is still required, but should be forward-looking. 
The road ahead is one of increased deregulation, at least in what concerns general policies. 
The tendency seems to be, and desirably so, for stronger intervention only on specific 
points of distortion of competition.  
2.1.3 The desirable starting point 
Discarded the options of differently orientated systems, the intertwining of mechanisms 
and legislation in place in the EU market is one with the potential to best meet the goal of 
adequately addressing B2C disputes. It allows the market to function without undue 
interference or burdening and displays the ability to align the best interests of all parties: 
state, industry and citizens. Nonetheless the timeliness, efficiency and efficacy of currently 
available consumer dispute settlement mechanisms are susceptible of criticism and conflict 
levels cannot be said to be decreasing
48
.  
  
                                                 
47
 For simplification purposes, consumers/complainants/users will be referred to in the male gender. 
48
 See, ahead, the Portuguese and German examples.  
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3 Sound Check: reaching consumers while attending to the market’s 
needs. 
3.1 Customer satisfaction and quality management 
Beforehand, it‟s essential to understand the correlation between customers‟ expectations 
and experience. In developed markets, most CSP offer customer service, as customer 
satisfaction is an important element to win over competition. Customer satisfaction is, 
however, closely connected to the way end-users experience and evaluate the performance 
of their CSP, both regarding the services or products provided and customer care. It‟s by 
and large a psychological process. For some consumers, satisfaction might express a 
positive reaction to a performance that fulfilled their expectations, while to others this may 
be met with indifference, because satisfaction is associated to a performance which 
substantially exceeds their expectations
49
. 
 This psychological dimension is also embedded in the act of complaining
50
. Complainants 
wish to be treated fairly and with respect; to be listened to and have their position 
acknowledged
51
 instead of feeling or being judged; be given an explanation and/or an 
apology; have action taken and be kept informed of its progression; and to be guaranteed 
the problem will not repeat itself. An end-user who experiences a mishandling of his 
complaint is likely to maintain a feeling of dissatisfaction towards the CSP, even if the 
                                                 
49
 “Intrinsic quality and perceived quality are two different things especially as consumers are becoming more 
demanding and informed about the choices available to them.”, in Consumer Satisfaction Survey, conducted 
by the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission, the Malaysian NRA: 
http://www.skmm.gov.my/consumer/css.asp.    
50
 Andreasen (1988), and Chelminski (n.y).   
51
 There is evidence inclusively of a difficulty felt by some complainants to have their complaints recognised 
as such by their CSPs – e.g., Ofcom (2009), Points 4.21, 4.45-4.48, amongst others.  
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complaint is resolved in his favour (because he will have experienced emotional distress, 
loss of time and/or income, unnecessary expenditure, etc
52
) and thus might not wish to keep 
his contractual bonds beyond strictly necessary
53
.  
This implies complaint-management systems play an important role in risk management, 
not just because complaints have an impact on CSP‟s public image and may compromise 
performance standards and quality assurance policies, but also because they are crucial in 
acquisition and retention of customers. Hence, those psychological needs must be met by 
an ADR system that proposes to offer quality and voice to the consumer.  
3.2 Information 
Increasing awareness of existing IDR and ADR systems, of their functioning and their 
accessibility is key to empowering consumers and give a practical effect to the right of 
complaint. This may be pursued at a moment prior to the manifestation of dissatisfaction, at 
the conflict stage or through a combination of both. Preference is given here to raising 
awareness at both phases. Doing so earlier strengthens consumer trust, as it gives the user a 
sense of ground for dialog and compromise should something go wrong, while at a conflict 
stage, it reminds consumers of the choices of action at their disposal and dispels distress 
associated with lack of bargaining power.  
As specific awareness-raising measures and the minimum of information to be included are 
discussed ahead (Sections 3.3.1 and 5), a brief outline here suffices. ADR existence and 
means of access should be displayed with adequate prominence, clarity and synthesis in all 
main points of interaction between providers and consumers (a CSP‟s website, points of 
sale, customer service channels – e.g., emails, enquiry replies and voice message in 
helpline service – and marketing material), besides contracts. Further, similar information 
                                                 
52
 Stress, anxiety, frustration… http://www.ofcom.org.uk/consult/condocs/alt_dis_res/futuresight/. Also, 
confirming these results, the later study conducted at OFCOM‟s request by Synnovate, in Ofcom, (2009), 
Points 4.21, 4.33-4.38  and Annex 8.  
53
 Erro! A origem da referência não foi encontrada.em, Point 4.15. 
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should be included in the NRA‟s website and in the replies to consumer enquiries or 
complaints it may receive.      
Inadvertently, this may result in an escalation of complaints, including frivolous and 
vexatious complaints
54
.  Nonetheless, the benefits of increasing awareness and accessibility 
far exceed potential costs
55
 brought by a complaint rising: enhanced consumer trust and 
empowerment, effective access to justice, industry constraint by competition and likely 
improvement or innovation in complaint-handling (namely, to avoid external ADR costs).  
It should be a target for the market to provide ever better service with growing quality and 
choice, including customer service, and this, in turn, can lead to decreased levels of 
dissatisfaction
56
, or at least of complaint lodging.  
Still, even where consumer satisfaction promotes competition, it is not clear end-users will 
always take consumer service quality standards into account when choosing their CSP. 
This is especially so if they have other benefits to gain
57
 or consider it unlikely to need 
customer service and making a complaint in the future
58
 (similarly to early termination 
penalties “surprises”: most consumers don‟t enter contracts considering they may terminate 
them before the expiry of the minimum contract period, often overlooking additional 
charges associated with early termination as a relevant choice factor between services and 
CSP). Indeed, consumers should have the freedom to opt for the CSP whose customer 
service best suits their needs. The relevant starting point is that they must be provided with 
clear and complete information on which to base their choice on.  
Hence, regulatory intervention may be required concerning the publication and marketing 
of consumer service quality standards, performance standards (namely, service quality) and 
other quality assurance policies by CSP. Only aware of the benefits and consequences of 
                                                 
54
 See ahead, the case study. 
55
 As a reference, see the estimation of cost rise associated to increase of ADR awareness conducted by 
Ofcom: “Statement…”, Point 5.29 Ofcom (2010)  
56
 For examples of types of dissatisfaction associated with complaint-handling procedures, see Ofcom (2010) 
“Statement…”, Point 3.28, Figure 2.  
57
 Ibidem, Point 4.14. 
58
 Ibidem, Point 4.16. 
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the existence, or inexistence, of those contractual obligations, can end-users strive for 
compliance by their providers and seek redress. This is instrumental to ADR effectiveness 
itself. Similarly marketing materials and other sources of consumer information should be 
ensured to provide a high level of transparency and completeness, further contributing to 
proactive dispute prevention.    
3.3 A proposal for a multi-layered complaint-handling scheme 
The objectives of the scheme have been identified above: to provide fair, affordable and 
timely resolution of complaints presented by end-users to their CSPs, in an effective
59
 and 
efficient manner. The procedure must be accessible (neither imposing nor constrained by 
obstacles which may hinder the exercise of the right to complain – see note 65); friendly 
(ease of use, comprehensible in its process, flexible, reliable and contemplative of 
multicultural diversity, e.g. language) and it must be conducted in accordance with the rule 
of law, be transparent and be impartial, including with regard to the outcome. Its solutions 
must be substantiated, predictable and should be susceptible of enforcement (a binding 
decision which can be enforced or subjected to judicial review)
 60
.  
Thus orientated, the scheme incorporates the mechanisms already present in the market, 
along with their experience and expertise, and is responsive to the end-users‟ needs and 
feedback.    
3.3.1 Common points: defining and implementing an ADR policy and mechanisms 
Most – if not all – IDR/ADR share common features. When used effectively, complaint-
management systems can assist in monitoring the implementation of regulatory obligations 
and help develop a more effective compliance culture. Equally important, they permit 
identifying systemic issues and improving business models and customer service itself, 
namely by pushing forward innovative business solutions. 
                                                 
59
 Including cost-effective. 
60
 For a definition of these principles, see the Commission Recommendation of 4 April 2001, infra, and 
corresponding articles in Black‟s Law Dictionary, Bryan A. Garner (Ed.), Gale Cengage, 9th Edition 
(Hardcover).  
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Consequently, B2C complaint-management systems need a core set of principles, standards 
and objectives that express the entity‟s commitment towards their users/consumers, guide 
staff when addressing consumer concerns and inform the public of how complaints are 
handled. These guidelines should suit the “individual needs, structure and modes of service 
delivery”61 of the entity that conducts ADR. Nonetheless, there is a minimum normative 
core to be demanded in a democratic state of law (Section 4.3)
62
. Those principles and 
practices should be embodied in a complaint management policy and corresponding 
complaint-handling procedure(s). While the procedure(s) implement(s) the policy‟s 
purposes, it is up to the policy to set the direction, clarify meanings and facilitate 
consistency and fairness in decision-making.  
Ensuing, to ensure maximum effectiveness of an ADR system, “the complaint-management 
policy must be consistent with [the entity‟s] strategic goals, operational plans, performance 
standards (...) and quality assurance and risk management policies”63. Further on, it 
requires internal and external dissemination of the policy and complaint procedure(s). To 
this aim, operators and NRAs have a wide range of strategies at their disposal, namely: 
workshops and other educational initiatives, both for the staff handling the complaints and 
other workers connected to the entity‟s public image (e.g. public relations, marketing or 
service managers, as well as chief-executive officers); information sharing and networking 
(e.g., between companies and/or other consumer affairs professionals); awareness 
campaigns addressed at consumers; process reviews and improved reporting, or improved 
partnerships. 
Concomitantly, market research, information networking, benchmarking (namely, for 
effectiveness and performance evaluation, budgeting and cost control), codes of conduct 
and best practices can be used to improve existing complaint-handling systems, raising 
standards and maximising end-users‟ experience. Especially for NRAs and CSP offering a 
                                                 
61
 Queensland Ombudsman (2006), p.1. 
62
 For a more comprehensive listing: International Standard Organisation in ISO 10002:2004 (Quality 
Management – Customer Satisfaction – Guidelines for Complaints Handling in Organisations); Australian 
Standard AS ISO 10002 – 2006 “Customer Satisfaction – Guidelines for complaints handling in 
organisations”. 
63
 Queensland Ombudsman (2006), p.3. 
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myriad of complaint procedures, there‟s a need to make them complementary and guide 
end-users through the process. CSP and NRAs may opt to keep their complaint channels 
separated into different response units, but for end-users it is all part of one overall multi-
channel experience. They choose how they approach CSP or the NRA, not the opposite. 
Therefore, it‟s relevant that end-users have an understanding of how their complaints will 
be processed and analysed. End-users must be informed clearly and transparently, in plain 
language, of:  
a) The scope of the policy and procedure(s) (to whom and what they apply): 
- the limits of NRAs‟ jurisdiction on national markets and over specific services may 
not be clear to consumers; similarly, CSP may offer different customer service and 
complaint systems to different types of clients or according to the package(s) or 
services contracted;  
- CSP may choose to handle complaints presented solely to and about their own 
services or choose to include (some or all types of) complaints presented to or 
concerning their agents and business partners. This extension has the advantage of 
heightening CSP‟s awareness of their partnerships‟ quality and business standards. It 
may be achieved by creating codes of conduct between the operators and their partners 
regarding quality standards on service and complaint-handling, as well as complaint-
report mechanisms
64
, and  
- clarification of legitimacy and admissibility criteria: individual complaints only (and 
by whom: natural persons, small business retail customers, etc), or acceptance of 
collective, representative and aggregated complaints, etc;  
                                                 
64
 Though the potential costs of forwarding all complaints or of an eventual interconnection of the companies‟ 
information systems may render these alternatives impracticable, a (finely tuned) reporting system between 
operators and their partners can nevertheless contribute to improve the partnership. It can function as a 
valuable risk management and marketing tool, while benefiting consumers. Such reporting should namely 
concern the number and type of complaints received, the average time for their resolution and an agreement 
on general complaint-handling minimum standards to be observed, in addition to the forwarding of 
complaints that specifically concern the CSP‟s services/products. Here, too, educational initiatives, such as 
workshops for the CSP‟s partners‟ staff dealing with customers and complaint-handling can not only endow 
workers with a vision of the values and goals of the CSP, but also help prevent an escalation of complaints 
into disputes, by transforming the bottom line (the partners and their staff) into an effective customer relation 
channel for the CSP itself.     
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b) Core principles, specific goals and quality standards – including disclosure of any 
benchmarks of seriousness or formality required before the complaint procedure is 
activated (if any); criteria for assessing prioritisation of complaints (if any), and 
assertion of confidentially and due respect on analysis; 
c) Costs for the end-user, if any; 
d) How/when information about progression of complaints is given/accessible to the 
claimant; 
e) Possible outcomes – namely, types of outcomes (advice, decision, forwarding to 
another entity, inquiry without decision relevant for the claimant...); binding or non-
binding nature and enforceability of outcome; whether there is a redress mechanism in 
place or enforcement oversight by an authority, etc;   
f) Timeframes – including average time of response or decision;  
g) Requisites for review of decisions, when existent, and by whom, including information 
about the expertise and experience of the reviewing body/panel/officer, where 
appropriate, and about other ADR systems, alongside admissibility of appeal to Courts, 
and  
h) Welcoming of feedback – responsiveness to end-users surpasses offering flexible 
solutions, acknowledging their participation in the proceedings or allowing them to 
seek information on the progression of the complaint. It includes valuing their 
experience when going through the process and using their feedback to improve the 
system. Complaints cost money and customer feedback is vital for risk management
65
.  
 
Finally, and taking into account the multicultural landscape of the EU space, thought 
should be given to incorporating multi-language versions.    
  
                                                 
65
 Just as by highlighting systemic failures it permits their correction and potentially decreases future claims‟ 
costs (and loss of customers, for operators), feedback can assist in identifying aspects perceived as positive by 
complainants, allowing to reproduce such features mutatis mutandi in other points of the system.  
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4 Jazzing up consumer rights in Portugal: a case study.   
In 2006, in Portugal, Decree-Law no. 156/2005, 15
th
 September
66
, extended to the 
communications market the obligation for establishments open to the public to make a 
complaint book available to their customers.  
4.1 The complaint book 
The complaint book consists of a paper-made instrument, in the shaping of a regular book, 
where consumers may register complaints against the CSP the book pertains to. Its pages 
are numbered and available in triplicate-form. The first copy is intended for the regulatory 
authority; the duplicate for the complainant, so as to provide him with a physically durable 
copy he can refer back to; and the triplicate, which must remain in the book, for purposes 
of inspection by the competent NRA.  
The book is available to customers at the premises of every establishment open to the 
public gratuitously, freely (without requiring justification) and immediately on request. If 
the book is refused or inexistent, customers may solicit the presence of public authorities 
and file a complaint, which is sent to the NRA. Both its refusal and inexistence constitute 
statutory infractions. All complaints are sent to the competent authority, ICP-ANACOM, 
the communications NRA
67
, within a maximum period of 5 days. The displaying of a 
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Altered by Decree-Law 371/2007, 6 November, and Decree-Law 118/2009, 19 May. For a general 
understanding: 
 http://www.anacom.pt/render.jsp?contentId=296309  
http://www.anacom.pt/render.jsp?categoryId=246722  
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/events/euro_cons_summit/docs/Ribeiro.pdf 
For a Portuguese version of all Acts: 
 http://www.pgdlisboa.pt/pgdl/leis/lei_mostra_articulado.php?nid=737&tabela=leis  
67
 Decree-Law 156/2005, Articles 1 to 6. 
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signpost, informing of the availability of the book in that establishment and the authority 
the complaints are sent to, is also compulsory. 
CSP are required to contest complaints, within 10 days, when notified to do so by the NRA 
on specific cases. The regulator keeps statistical data on the type and nature of the 
complaints, which is periodically sent to the Direcção-Geral do Consumidor (Directorate-
General for the Consumer, hereafter DGC)
68
. 
4.1.1 Rationale of Decree-Law no. 156/2005 
The Act endeavours to empower consumers, by endowing them with the means to exercise 
their right of complain in locus, strengthening their rights of citizenship, information and 
access to justice: all complaints are to be duly analysed and answered.  
Concomitantly, it sets in place a market monitoring system, with clear benefits for the 
State. By reporting occurrences via the complaint book, each complainant is in turn a 
controller of the market‟s activities, alerting authorities to (potential) violations of sector 
rules and contributing to the overseeing and sanctioning roles of those same authorities.  
4.2 Requiem for the Complaint Book 
The book may rightfully be praised by its accessibility and ease of use, which in turn 
contributed to a strong generalised awareness and adherence by the public. In very generic 
terms, the majority of complaints received may be divided into three groups:  
a) those concerning communication services proprio sensu, which can be sub-grouped into 
contractual issues and complaints regarding sector specific rules that impose obligations on 
undertakings;  
b) those concerning consumerism issues, and  
                                                 
68
 Decree-Law 156/2005, Articles 6(2) and 12. 
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c) those concerning the practice of an economic activity other than the providing of ECS, 
by a CSP or an agent or partner of a CSP.  
In addition, a forth group can be identified, aggregating vexatious or frivolous complaints. 
Of all these, only the complaints concerning the compliance by CSP with sector specific 
rules fall under the scope of the communications NRA. Consumer-related issues and the 
supervision of other economic activities fall under jurisdiction of other NRAs, while 
contractual matters remain the object of private law.  
Yet, because competence to handle the complaints was established according to a market 
criterion, all complaints are sent to ICP-ANACOM. There‟s no previous filtering according 
to, e.g., content. What‟s more, it is the Authority‟s obligation to answer all complaints, 
including those it does not have jurisdiction to address. In these cases, the Portuguese NRA 
has chosen to inform end-users on its powers and role, on methods of conflict resolution 
available to them and about the users‟ general rights regarding ECS. The book makes use 
of the NRA‟s resources but keeps it to a limited participation in the outcome. It puts 
unjustified public expectations (and pressure) on the NRA, called to answer a great number 
of solicitations falling outside its jurisdiction, and pulls away valuable resources from 
complaints that are of its competency, lengthening their resolution. 
For consumers, the impasse is similar. Able to voice their concerns, end-users expect(ed) 
not just a reply, but a solution. However, complaints aren‟t met with a solution analogous 
to that of a court or other dispute settlement body, because ICP-ANACOM has no 
jurisdiction to resolve them
69
. Hence claimants are compelled to make new complaints or 
solicit one of the other NRAs for information – again, without obtaining formal resolution. 
This implies new delays and potential losses for consumers, negatively affecting their trust 
and satisfaction regarding the implemented system.  
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 Law 5/2004, Article 107, and ICP-ANACOM‟s Statutes, Articles 6(1)(q), 16(1) and (2) and 18. 
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On the other hand, complainants “misuse” the book, disregarding its formalities (some 
complaints extend for several pages; being handwritten, it gives a bleak view of the task of 
treating the data) and overlooking its scope and rationale (even appraisals may be found). 
Moreover, as no criteria exist to use the book, the likelihood of insistencies (repetition of 
the same dissatisfaction regarding the same facts) before the claim has had an opportunity 
to be dealt with, is higher. And, not uncommonly, disputes are solved by the parties before 
the NRA‟s reply arrives.  
Finally, this initial distribution of competence may generate conflicts of negative and 
positive authority, between different NRAs. This is especially true when the complaint 
concerns new technology or electronic services connected to the activities of more than one 
Authority.  
The grave consequences of it are, however, best perceived when looking at complaint 
values
70
. In 2005 ICP-ANACOM received, directly or indirectly, 3,754 complaints. Yet, in 
2006, the first year with the book, a staggering 17,296 complaints were registered. Of 
those, 11,773 were reported via the complaint book (almost 70% of the total value), 
representing an overall increase of 361% regarding the previous year. In 2007 that number 
grew to 24,745 (with the complaint book accounting for 68% of that volume) and in 2008 it 
reached the 33,814 complaints (75% via the complaint book). In 2009, 41,989 complaints 
were registered
71
. Comparatively, complaints which actually fall under the scope of the 
regulatory Authority or another entity represent a marginal number
72
. 
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 Annex 2. 
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 All statistical information retrieved from http://www.anacom.pt/render.jsp?categoryId=315335. The values 
presented refer only to complaints formalised in writing and include postal services‟ complaints, as they do 
not alter the interpretation of the results and on a wider scale these services could have been integrated in this 
paper‟s scope. Other types of solicitations such as information and statistical requests and petitions are 
excluded.  
72
 Though there is no official document wherefrom comprehensive values may be gathered, the analysis of 
the complaints‟ content (Annex 2) allows extrapolating that few could amount to statutory or regulatory 
infractions. Another hint to the reasonability of this inference may be found in the following table, where 
under the second column are presented numbers for infraction proceedings carried out throughout 2009:   
http://www.anacom.pt/streaming/contra_ordenacoes_2009.pdf?contentId=335871&field=ATTACHED_FILE 
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4.3 Dissonances – consumers and the electronic communications market 
 
“Conflict is the beginning of consciousness”,  
M. Esther Harding 
 
The relevance of the Portuguese example resides in understanding the reason behind the 
complaint increase and the general acceptance of the book despite its limited scope and 
outcomes.  
On analysing the complaints rising, the numbers could translate a decline in quality, 
transparency and maybe even free competition within the Portuguese communications 
market, since 2006. Alternatively, it could be argued that the ubiquity and gratuity 
introduced by the complaint book solved a problem of accessibility to complain systems
73
. 
Here, the dissatisfaction would have already been present in the market and the book 
merely allowed depicting that reality, introducing transparency and a chance for a real 
evaluation of the market‟s quality.  
Unquestionably, the book granted a practical meaning and efficacy to the right to complain. 
Yet that‟s insufficient to justify the steady upheaval of complaints‟ after 2005, especially 
when, prior to 2006, there were already in place complaint schemes by ICP-ANACOM and 
the DGC, consumer ADR mechanisms (namely, consumer arbitration centres), and IDR 
from CSP.  
The lack of structural or noticeable internal changes in the market during that period (2005-
2006), whether due to the entry of new CSP or the introduction of new services, sets aside 
market-based reasons. What‟s more, the complaint increase didn‟t register solely in 
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 A positive correlation between the perceived accessibility of information and information use has been 
noted in previous research: Swanson (1982); Maish (1979). In this literature, reference can be found to three 
dimensions of informational accessibility: reliability (certain, dependable, failure-free); convenience (close, 
convenient, nearby, and unobstructed); and ease of use (flexible, forgiving, understandable and friendly). The 
complaint book encompasses all three characteristics. On a more specific note, four principles have been 
highlighted regarding the accessibility of web content: perception, operability, understandability and 
robustness (http://www.w3.org/TR/WCAG20/).     
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geographical areas where a lesser availability or use of new technologies, such as the 
internet, could have until then hindered the exercise of the right to complain. It registered 
equally in urbanised areas, where consumer society is more tangible.  
This paper suggests a third option. Consumer awareness of their rights, of the availability 
of different products and services, of substitutability and interchange, and of quality of 
service has been raised by media and social exposure. 
There is research indicating that the “(l)evels of complaints are closely tied to expectations” 
and that “(a)ctive consumerism requires a level of literacy and education to be effective. 
(...) The well-informed, middle-class person knows how to complain (...)” but “the less 
well-educated person in the same position may not be able to achieve the same thing”74. 
Though this is especially true for less developed markets, where the lack of alternatives 
(competition) and information can sometimes dictate higher satisfaction levels
75
, it also 
finds an application in developed markets.  The higher the awareness of one‟s rights and of 
the channels to voice one‟s dissatisfaction, the more likely they will be used. When to this 
is added a freely and immediately accessible information system, such as the complaint 
book, the starting point to understand the Portuguese case is found.  
In parallel, the high number of complaints may translate an emotional response to 
frustration (the inability to solve the complaint on a face-to-face contact) and to a desire to 
feel empowered (by requesting the book, complainants create an official registry which is 
reported to the NRA, exerting pressure over CSP). It corroborates the conclusions in 
Section 3.1. This partly explains the book‟s popularity, despite not offering remedy, and 
what seems a trend for a “growing gap between enquiries and complaints, with the 
complaint level continuously rising”76.    
                                                 
74
 Southwood (2006), p.3 and 7. 
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 Southwood (2006), p.3. 
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http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/33564/publicationFile/282/AnnualReport2004Id20
43pdf.pdf, Tables 1 and 2, p.1-2. 
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Likewise, it points to a saturation of information. Increased information availability creates 
the challenge of filtering that same information: the quality of the data retrieved is 
determined by its adequacy to the user‟s intended purpose. In other words, it has become 
difficult for consumers to assess their rights‟ scopes, as well as the adequate means for their 
exercise
77
. Despite the informative effort, a great majority of consumers still believe that 
communications NRAs‟ supervisory functions include oversight of contractual matters 
concerning their provision contracts
78
.  
From a kinetic perspective
79
, the scheme fails to address complainants‟ expectations of 
effectiveness. The NRA‟s answers are often tardy and offer no remedy; and where the 
CSP‟s customer service permitted conflicts to become long-standing or deemed them 
deadlocked, the book failed to make a contribution. From a consumer perspective, it is a 
redundant system. It creates optimal conditions for voicing end-users, but gives them no 
real means of action. Solutions reside, as with before the book, in dialogue with the 
provider, resorting to ADR on their own initiative or resorting to Courts.  
Undeniably though, the book originates administrative costs that may find repercussion on 
the service costs charged to end-users (the „waterbed‟ effect80). Though some costs are 
higher in the beginning, decreasing over time, others are ongoing –  the cost of the books, 
of sending the complaint-sheets to the NRA, of changes to the CSPs‟ customer service for 
implementing the new system and to log and deal with the increase of complaints, amongst 
others. 
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 This problem, noted by Spiros Simitis in 1970, is still poignant today, if the user of the information system 
lacks the required technical understanding to effectively use it or to assess the relevance or validity of the 
retrieved information. It raises transparency issues. Cfr. Bing and Harvold (1977), p. 233.       
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 Also noted in the German case: 
http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/33564/publicationFile/282/AnnualReport2004Id20
43pdf.pdf, p.3-4 
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 The notion of kinetic consequences of law was advanced by Wolfgang Fikentscher, to express the need to 
contemplate the evolution and effects of law in its application, during the process of interpreting-applying 
norms. See Larenz (1997), p.340. 
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 In essence, the pressing down of prices or the absorption of costs in one part of the firm‟s operations leads 
to another set of prices to rise.  
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Though consumer education and some changes to the book‟ functioning could enhance its 
qualitative performance, its objectives and rationale may be achieved by more effective 
alternatives. It‟s this more complex ADR system that will be delineated next. 
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5 A new symphony: the workings of the scheme – a holistic approach 
5.1 Accessibility: ubiquity, convenience, reliability and ease of use   
Internet infrastructures and access are nowadays widespread in developed countries, with 
companies relying on electronic means and equipment on their daily routines. Even small 
establishments pertaining to a CSP will, as a rule, have or be able to have internet access on 
their premises. This can serve as a ubiquitous and easily accessible gateway to deploy a 
complaint scheme and may suitably replace more resources-consuming alternatives, such 
as the Portuguese complaint book
81
.  
A computer present at store-points may be used to engage end-users in lodging complaints 
directly into an ICT system. To limit misuses, internet access may be restricted to the 
websites of the CSP and the communications NRA through administrative settings. Then, 
and to reinforce transparency, the path to lodge the complaint should be easily visible or 
intuitive for end-users when browsing.  
In parallel, the inclusion on the operator‟s homepage or next to the electronic complaint-
scheme of a direct link to the consumer information webpage of the NRA will facilitate and 
expedite end-users access to relevant information. This, together with a notice that these 
proceedings do not preclude further action (the NRA‟s complaint scheme, other ADR 
procedures or the legal system), may contribute to enhance consumers‟ trust. 
In this model, the complaint mechanism available at a CSP‟s establishment is the same that 
can be accessed from home. This allows homogenising and standardising procedures, 
                                                 
81
 Presently, there is a legislative effort to introduce an electronic complaint book, with a market-specialized 
scope and with complaints to be sent directly to NRAs. It is not yet clear whether it will coexist with the 
current book. A national network was also created to allow checking on the progression of complaints by 
claimants and doing searches of complaints per company (https://rtic.consumidor.pt/publico).   
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including complaint-handling services
82
, and may help tone down the initial impetus to 
complain by customers who don‟t find a satisfactory solution at the store. It gives them an 
opportunity to reflect on the situation and may give CSP adequate time to address the issue. 
Users can still complain from home, with the same ease and effectiveness and without 
additional loss of time, if the problem persists.  
Though not a novelty, online filing (of complaints) and the use of new technologies as 
platforms of communication and data exchange have not yet become a tool explored to 
their full potential in ADR. Why this is so concerns mainly: 
 business choices (costs related to implementing the necessary technological changes83, 
staff training, maintenance and management of the system(s), security requirements
84
, 
etc, or the access to or cost of the technology itself, in developing countries); 
 the inability (including lack of technical or language skills ) or unwillingness by the 
end-user to use ADR online platforms, and 
 system restrictions incorporated into the platform by the system manager (the CSP or 
ADR body), hindering its flexibility
85
 and limiting its usability by end-users.  
In truth, though, ICT can have a tremendous impact in decreasing access barriers and 
equity concerns
86
. Even the use of a computer as a gateway instead of a paper-type system 
allows complainants to benefit from software to overcome physical disabilities and the lack 
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 Possibly lowering costs. 
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 Including new infrastructures, when needed.  
84
 Some may be conducted to technical concepts and solutions that should answer the legal requirements of 
such a scheme. See Bonnet et alias (2004). Others will relate to the particular normative implications of the 
choices made regarding the software and the system design 
(http://www.juridicum.su.se/proactivelaw/NordicSchoolofProactiveLawConference2005.pdf, p.2).     
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 Flexibility and simplicity are essential marks of ADR. Examples of these unnecessary restrictions are 
online limitations imposed to attaching documents to support the claim, requiring the sending of (physical) 
evidence through different communications means (namely post), or requiring evidence from claimants which 
would be fairly simple or costless for the CSP to obtain, but possibly difficult or costly for the service user.   
86
 Several projects currently under development focus, for example, on e-accessibility and inclusive e-
governance aimed at people with disabilities. See http://www.w3.org/TR/WCAG20/, on web content 
accessibility, and http://www.eaccessplus.eu/. Also, the surge of a concept of universal design, oriented 
towards “designing for a universality” of users: http://accessit.nda.ie/useandapply/ict 
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of literacy skills. Such tools are available for all operating systems
87
. In Germany, the 
Bundesnetzagentur recently introduced measures for implementation of a text and video 
relay service for deaf and hearing-impaired persons
88
. Its application, if extended to 
complaint-handling procedures, could further enhance the user‟s experience.    
Though end-users may choose to immediately resort to a third-party to settle their claim, 
they should be encouraged to first engage their operators‟ IDR. Hence, when a different 
choice is made, the system in place should suppress the lack of opportunity given to the 
CSP to intervene (see ahead Section 5.4.1). 
5.2 The CSP’s complaint scheme 
Opting firstly for the CSP‟s complaints-handling procedure(s) gives the parties an 
opportunity to jointly achieve a solution, promoting dialogue and accountability, while 
potentially uncovering systemic or business-model failures. The choice then falls in what 
standards should be demanded, if any, of such schemes, what results should be expected 
and, equally important, how to intertwine them with other ADR schemes
89
. 
5.2.1 Standards 
A scheme minutely defined on a statutory or regulatory level, for homogenous 
implementation by all CSP, could deter operators from finding more creative and customer 
friendly solutions, hindering the use of customer service as a competition enhancer. The 
conclusions drawn above about a hard law approach prove applicable here as well. 
Conversely, not imposing minimum standards would jeopardise consumer protection 
(including, access to justice) and could determine the exclusion of special groups of 
consumers.  
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 Magnifier, Narrator (Windows), Orca(Linux), VoiceOver (Apple), etc. 
88
 http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/media/archive/17343.pdf, p.29. See also http://www.tess-relay-
dienste.de/ 
89
 Section 5.4. 
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Establishing high minimum normative standards on a statutory or regulatory level, to guide 
the industry on the mapping of their customer service and complaint-handling 
culture/policies, might therefore present a best practice direction. Furthermore, it is easier 
to enforce against. This minimum assured, CSP are free to adapt their customer service to 
best suit their customers‟ needs and to create a company image. Though this minimum 
normative threshold may need some gradation to accommodate business cultures and the 
specificities of national markets, it can facilitate future harmonisation of standards or 
procedures on an EU level
90
. More, it permits applying a homogenised level of protection 
to all consumers, disregarding of what CSP(s) they subscribe. It is the option being 
currently implemented in the UK, by Ofcom
91
, who assessed the benefits of introducing a 
single Code of Practice, approved by Ofcom, as opposed to the application of individual 
Codes of Practice by each CSP
92
.  
5.2.2 Connection with other ADR schemes or the NRA’s complaints mechanisms 
Here too
93, an interconnection of the CSP‟s information systems with the NRA‟s, for 
automatic forwarding or reporting of complaints, is a solution too complex, costly and 
highly burdening for the market. Furthermore, it would achieve similar results to 
mechanisms such as the complaint book and could tone down the autonomy and 
independence of CSP‟s IDR, weakening their accountability and flexibility towards their 
customers. 
Nonetheless CSP‟s IDR can be perceived as integrating a „broader conflict resolution 
system‟, of which they constitute the first line of response. They are in a privileged position 
                                                 
90
 A pan-European  web-based form for filing consumer complaints with an escalation procedure to ADR is 
presently being deployed, for cross-border disputes: 
http://www.euroconsumatori.org/16854v16854d49857.html; http://www.euroconsumatori.org/16853.html; 
http://cordis.europa.eu/fetch?CALLER=PROJ_ICT&ACTION=D&CAT=PROJ&RCN=62867 With a 
broader scope than the one envisioned in this paper, it may add stock to the choosing of principles and 
guidelines to adopt in a future harmonisation of B2C ADR procedures, in the European ECS market.    
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 Ofcom (2010), Section 4. 
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 Ofcom (2009), Point 4.11 and 4.8. Point 4.8 also expresses this paper‟s initially expressed concern over the 
exclusion of the consumer from the protection provided by the current two level system of regulatory and 
supervisory protection. See also Points 5.2, 5.4, 5.11, 5.17 and 5.19ss. 
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 See note 64. 
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to prevent dispute escalation, accelerate conflict resolution and diminish costs and losses 
for consumers. CSP must be required to recognise that responsibility and the need for their 
interdependence with other market mechanisms in achieving swift access to justice and 
effective consumer information/education (for which clearer and more transparent contracts 
are essential). But even within this holistic approach, there is still a want for an 
intermediary stage between CSP and the judiciary system, fostering industry compliance, 
consumer protection and dispute resolution accessibility and effectiveness. How these 
functions may be pursued will be discussed in Section 5.4.   
5.2.3 “Consumer-Friendly” Contracts 
Not uncommonly, subscribers receive a copy of the services‟ general clauses or of the form 
they fill out, but not a „one-piece document‟ aggregating those clauses, the specific terms 
where the contract departs from the general clauses (for example, where tariffs or 
contractual obligations/rights result from a time-limited marketing campaign) and other 
relevant contract terms (possible maintenance terms, service quality standards and penalties 
for their non-compliance, etc). Hence users are seldom aware of all particulars relevant for 
exercising their rights, even when written down in contract form. Even if consumers have 
access to the entirety of the applicable contract terms, it‟s unreasonable to expect them to 
read them through and be proficient enough to extract the pertinent information to engage 
with their CSP fully aware of their options and rights. 
Improvements here can carry a proactive effect. Together with keeping up-to-date 
contractual information available on their websites and at store-points, a shorter, simpler 
but more complete „one-document type‟ version of that information should be supplied in 
durable form by CSP to subscribers, when entering into contract – a type of “consumer-
friendly contract” (CFC).  
While not to be underestimated, the burden or expenditure for operators to develop an 
aggregated version of the ECS provision contracts they already apply, in plain language 
and transparency-orientated, is likely reasonable, especially when compared with possible 
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consumer benefits
94
 (hence, from a proportionality point of view). CFCs draw on the 
assumption that gathered (as opposed to scattered) and simplified valuable information may 
be more appealing to consumers, making it more likely to be read. Even if this reading 
exercise is conducted only at a later stage, it will simplify end-users‟ assessment of their 
rights and obligations, which in turn permits them to better evaluate their position, options 
and means of action. It intends to address the aforementioned difficulty in accessing and 
retrieving relevant information
95
. The efficacy of this empowerment however depends on 
the setting up of adequate and efficient redress mechanisms to follow-up.  
Though not dispensing all articulation with other juridical instruments, where they may be 
omissive, CFCs should enclose the basic information that constitutes the main consumer-
affecting terms of the contract, in a “close to telegraphic”96 manner. CFCs contribute to 
raising consumer awareness of contractual key points, furthering their ability to compare 
different offers. Concurrently they aim at putting the onus on CSP of demonstrating all 
relevant information was appropriately given to subscribers, especially with regard to 
contractual charges and compensation mechanisms. Lex ferenda, the consequences of not 
conveying such information could result in requiring demonstration of the secondary 
nature
97
 of the omitted clauses or of the clauses‟ fairness, at risk of rendering them non-
binding
98
.  
Templates of CFCs should be submitted by CSP to the NRA for approval of the type, 
extensiveness and simplicity of the information included
99
.     
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 The reasoning mentioned in Section 3.2, regarding the advantages of increasing information on ADR, is 
also valid here.  
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 Page 30 and note 77. 
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 CFCs should be designed to provide maximum information with the simplest and shortest text possible, 
dispensing with legal jargon and flourished-type language. 
97
 Clauses of which derive no charges or extra obligations for the user.  
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 In alignment with the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive‟s rationale. especially Articles 3 and 
6.  
99
 In Portugal, CSP are obliged to submit general contract clauses to ICP-ANACOM for approval previously 
to their use: Law 5/2004, Article 39/4, and ICP-ANACOM‟s Deliberation on Guidelines on the minimum 
content...”, Consideration II. The proposed submission is based in a similar consumer protection rationale.   
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In addition, incentivising the industry to lay down service quality standards and 
corresponding non-compliance compensations on CFCs will permit, on a conflict stage, to 
dispense with difficult evaluations of the parties‟ rights and obligations and to “automate” 
remedy awarding. This “automatic compensation” may be computed by the same 
information system used to collect and process the complaints‟ data, by crossing that data 
with a database containing the quality standards and penalties written down in the 
applicable CFC(s). The information system can be itself a tool of dispute resolution
100
. 
When the data treatment and conflict resolution are performed by other than the CSP‟s 
IDR, whether governmental or private, CSP should be given a fair opportunity to contest 
the resulting automated award, namely by providing evidence in contrary to the facts 
reported by the complainant. 
5.3   NRAs’ complaint scheme: 
Whether accessed directly or through a CSP‟s website, the area on the NRA‟s website for 
lodging a complaint should be linked to the consumer information section. An adequate use 
of the NRAs‟ resources requires consumers to be informed about their rights and options. 
Secondly, such information ought to be in plain language, transparent and comprehensive, 
and presented in a layout that suits the “transmission-media” and avoids alienating 
consumers. This could be achieved, for example, by: 
- Setting a list of end-users‟ statutory and regulatory rights at the top of the page, each a 
link leading to a section down the page where those rights are further elaborated; 
- Stressing the importance of reading ECS contracts, and 
- Placing a notice, next to the list of rights, explaining that oversight of the contractual 
situations described does not fall within the NRA‟s scope of powers, but that contract-
related disputes can be taken to their provider, an ADR system, consumer arbitration 
centres or Courts. Links should be provided to specific communications ADR, if 
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 Schultz (2003), p.3, and several literary references there included, especially footnotes 10, 16 and 17. 
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existent, and to other ADRs or consumer arbitration or mediation centres with 
jurisdiction over the content, along with basic information about each
101
. 
 
If the issue is not listed, end-users may be welcome to contact the regulator, namely to 
request information. If desiring to lodge a complaint, they should be encouraged (but not 
limited) to using online complaint schemes. 
5.3.1 Electronic case management systems102  
Electronic case management systems (ECMS) consist of software that enables the user to 
electronically manage cases‟ life cycles and treat data in an integrated way. They 
interconnect and interact with other software or systems, while more advanced ECMS are 
even able to perform tasks as intelligent agents
103
, displaying more or less autonomy in 
their performance. Further, ECMS expedite access to and sharing of data, whilst also 
enabling establishing different levels of access and actions according to user.  
In January 2007, ICP-ANACOM introduced a customised ECMS designated SGTSM for 
the handling of the market‟s solicitations, but it failed to connect it to any of its already 
available contact services. Indeed, web-based complaint lodgement forms (WCLF) are 
offered by businesses and government agencies worldwide, and the NRA itself has one 
such service: an online help-desk. Connecting the SGTSM to the online help-desk would 
have enabled the NRA to automatically process the information entered by complainants, 
accelerating proceedings in the initial stage
104
. Furthermore, this connection could be 
extended to the email service, with equal benefits. The key principle is guiding end-users 
through the process, so as to guarantee the information provided is as complete and 
accurate as possible.       
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 Namely, in fulfilment of E-Commerce Directive, Article 19(4). 
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 Testifying the improvement these systems, such as Resolve, can represent, MacMillan (2009), p.3.  
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 Schiavetta (2008), p.444. 
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 Currently, the data is inserted on a case-by-case basis by administrative staff, after a pre-evaluation of each 
complaint by a competent officer or administrative worker, and templates have been uploaded to serve as 
drafts for the answers sent to end-users. It would namely save the staff re-reading the complaints, firstly to 
classify them and later on to work on them. In this final phase, corrections to the classification would still be 
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5.3.2 Interconnecting WCLF and ECMS      
WCFL should be intuitive, secure and simple to use. Though other options are certainly 
conceivable, a tree-type choice interface
105
 allows narrowing the available choices on 
advancing through the form, guiding the complainant on the identification of the situation 
and facts to be reported. Interconnecting the WCLF with the ECMS has the potential to 
work as a content-based filter, while automating data insertion in the system: the choices 
made are registered as the complaint‟s classification. Just as importantly, it allows applying 
classifications the NRA already employs.  
This raises the question of whether end-users are able to make a sector specific assessment 
of their complaints. Yes and no. It‟s reasonable to assume end-users will know whether 
their complaints fall into categories described by everyday terms, such as “client support”, 
“equipment malfunction”, “refuse of warranty” or “internet speed”. Only sector specific 
problems could pose a challenge, but even some of these are easily recognisable. End-users 
might not know how to denominate a specific cabling or infrastructure problem, but most 
will know for example whether it fits into “infrastructures”, and possibly even “antennas” 
or “phone posts”. At the end, a blank field for inserting a short account of the facts would 
be available.  
Concomitantly the interconnection of the two systems would enable: 
a) Immediate automated answers  
- for complaints devoid of juridical relevance (e.g., “long waiting time”), and 
- for complaints on contractual issues. Here the message should include an explanation of 
the NRA‟s powers and a link to its informative page. Alternatively templates used by 
the NRAs can be prompted, enclosing that link. If an ADR scheme is available, 
mention and basic contact information should be included with appropriate 
highlighting. 
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 To which other more complex interface designs can be added, such as drop-down menus. 
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-  Benefits: increased workflow efficiency (attrition or elimination of “superfluous” steps 
in the case‟s life cycle, e.g. the sending of an initial receipt notice informing of 
subsequent analysis); improvement of response time, avoiding additional end-user 
distress caused by lengthy waiting or lack of information on progress; and allowing 
users to be immediately aware of their options and to proceed in an informed manner. 
b) Automated transfer, for complaints falling under the jurisdiction of another NRA or 
governmental agency.  
Benefits: speedier transfer of out-of-jurisdiction cases (reducing the number remaining 
at the NRA until analysis is completed). 
and  
c) Recording of the data by complainants to their own system, either for copy retention or 
in draft-form to be completed and submitted later. 
Benefits: providing complainants with a hard copy, facilitating future reference to it. 
   
Normally then only potential administrative infractions pertaining to the scope of NRAs 
and cases escaping the available classifications would be left out of an automated answer, 
allowing their prioritisation. This not only increases NRAs‟ capacity of response but also 
their time of response. The likelihood of infractions going unnoticed or prescribing due to 
lack of human and technical resources lessens. In these cases however, the scheme could 
still reply with a message informing that an assessment of the facts would be conducted, 
but that any decision by the NRA concerning the reported facts would not solve the actual 
conflict between the user and the CSP, nor set upon the provider any specific obligations, 
namely compensation. A link to the page listing contractual issues should therefore be 
provided. 
Thus “filtrating” complaints, NRAs may decide: 
- to treat them by sampling (i.e., to analyse a random sample of complaints to ensure the 
correction of their classification as introduced by end-users, with for example the option of 
always verifying complaints falling into certain categories – e.g., portability, 
infrastructures, suspension of service...), or  
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- to re-assess all cases, 
(with further answers being sent, when necessary, in both cases). 
Where multiple choice
106
 occurs (whether of services or of content/issues), two framings 
are possible. Firstly, all the services or content issues reported are susceptible of one single 
treatment/answer (for example, the services have a similar juridical treatment of the 
issue(s) reported or all issues concern contract-related situations or juridically irrelevant 
matters). Secondly, some of the subjects complained have juridical relevance within the 
NRA‟s scope, whether that applies to just one or all of the services involved, while other 
subjects don‟t.  
Either way, the solution requires the ECMS to prioritize subjects, in order to apply the 
correct message to the situation. ECMS can be customised to opt for the one with highest 
relevance, when confronted with parameters requiring different actions. If all parameters 
(the choices done) require the same treatment, the program will apply one common answer. 
If however some issues are of contractual nature and others deprived of juridical relevance, 
the message displayed should correspond to the contractual matters answer. Finally, if 
some subjects have juridical relevance for the NRA while others are merely contractual, 
then the solution would be the one applied to alleged infractions (which nonetheless 
includes a link to the informative page).    
In summary, the requirements/features of an ECMS should ensure regulators a better 
performance. In addition to those already mentioned, it should: 
- ensure accuracy on the interface level: a simple to use and understand interface must 
give comprehensive parameters of choice to end-users; the clearer (more specific) the 
system is made, the more complete the data extracted from it, boosting reliability; 
                                                 
106
 A multiple choice function in an ECMS simplifies the complainant‟s experience and offers advantages to 
NRAs at a time when many disputes concern complex webs of interrelated issues.  
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- be upgradeable to meet potential additions or changes (as well as to ensure its longevity, 
since continuous data loading into the system can potentially decrease its speed and 
workflow efficiency); 
- store the identification data of complainants in association to individual complaints; 
- allow the record of annotations and other entries on the cases; 
- do docketing (log the chronological workflow of complaints); 
- include a document library (for templates, finished documents, uploaded ones...); 
- be able to link with external programs, i.e. any supporting tools or other software 
relevant for the cases‟ management (namely with the WCLF software, outlook, etc, as 
well as previous software used by the NRA); 
- be flexible to recognise any standard document types;  
- allow different levels of access according to case management functions, based on roles 
and responsibility and, eventually, on access to/by third
 
party systems (for example, if 
the WCLF or the ECMS are acquired as web-services provided externally, or in the 
event of interconnection with other NRAs or ADR systems
107
) – remote access can also 
be contemplated; 
- incorporate case management methodologies (e.g., opening, closing, ascribing work to 
specific staff members, reviewing, re-opening and archiving of complaints), as well as 
create case management rules (e.g., rules to notify or alert, assign, remind, escalate, 
prioritise...); 
- allow bulk-load functionalities (for example, sorting and creating packages for “bulk” 
treatment of cases with the same features or to enter cases into a CSV or XML file), 
and 
- provide adequate privacy and data protection108. 
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 Managing access levels within the system is essential not just for workflow purposes, but also security. If 
access to third parties is considered, for example, thought should be placed in creating a data sharing and 
protection agreement between the organisations which will be granted some level of access, to serve as the 
basis for those access requirements.  
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 For which it‟s relevant to know the standards used by the supplier of the ECMS for software design, 
development and customer support, including any independent accreditation standards, so as to ensure high 
quality service/product providing. 
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Other criteria, features and tools can be added.  ECMS should be customised to NRAs‟ 
needs and CSP‟s business models. For example, a feature for obtaining parameterised 
statistic data facilitates detecting market irregularities, prompting a quicker internal report. 
When acquiring an ICT solution as this, nonetheless, it‟s important to negotiate system 
maintenance and support (namely, type of support included and/or provided past the roll-
out
109
 phase) as part of the package. This should encompass troubleshooting, staff training, 
database engineering and design upgrading, as well as user interface development.       
To summarise, a dynamic WCLF, going beyond traditional e-filing, improves consumers‟ 
experience
110
, while achieving flexibility and optimising data integration into the NRAs or 
CSP‟s database. The data becomes readily available and workable. Complementarily, an 
effective ECMS improves workflow quality, resources use and the overall response time.  
Though cost considerations may weight against the implementation of such ICT changes, 
they also carry benefits and reduction in expenditure. In a nutshell, and additionally to 
other advantages mentioned above:  
 “lower cost of processing submitted forms, lower postage and mail handling costs, 
fewer data entry errors”111  
 enabling to “build data validation, error checking and calculations into the form, 
improve standards of legibility and completeness of submitted forms and create 
dynamic questioning fields which (…) show users the fields they need to complete”112 
or opt between 
  decreased risk of files misplacing and enhanced data and file sharing (enabling, e.g., 
more than one officer to work on the same file at a time) 
 elimination of need for much paper storage and archiving 
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 Testing, implementation and set-in-practice of the software.  
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 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SmartForm.   
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http://smartforms.business.gov.au/developer/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=68&Itemid=99 
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 lessening of administrative costs connected to case management (from copying costs to 
staff hours) 
 support of regulatory compliance (by creation of rules to generate notification of cases 
fulfilling a conditional set of parameters) 
 improved risk management, by providing timelier solutions and avoiding administrative 
infractions to overdue, and increased productivity, both of which have a budgetary 
reflection.   
Moreover the increasing availability of open source ICT solutions and of compatibility 
software makes it progressively more sustainable to adopt such systems, further lowering 
potential costs of ICT reform or change. Brazil stands as an example in this adaptability, 
engaging open source solutions to “overcome distance and socioeconomic challenges”113. 
In Australia, the government is investing in the implementation of ICT solutions similar to 
those proposed. Resorting to both “Smartform” technology (a denomination for WCFL 
crafted by the Australian government to describe the dynamic and interactive nature of 
these web forms
114
) and ECMS, they aim at “[providing] people with simple, convenient 
access to government information, messages and services”115, while rendering overall 
better governance and transparency. With “a $42.4 million Budget initiative”116, the 
Australian government has been encouraging the adoption of ICT reform measures which 
are focused on consumer-service delivery, while introducing better coordination between 
government agencies, better utilisation of ICT assets, increasing standardisation of data and 
simplification of procedures. Though yet at a sub-optimal level on reaching the set goals 
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government directives or to implement ICT reform. 
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and cost return
117
, the benefits of using this type of technology are already measurable in 
some cases
118
. 
Similar approaches have been developed in Portugal by, namely, the Tax General-
Directorate. On the ECS market though, ICP-ANACOM opted for introducing the SGTSM 
and creating the End-User Support Unit, to address the continuing workload increase, 
whilst outsourcing services to deal with the administrative aspects of processing complaint 
data. In its Strategic Plan for 2009-2011
119
, the regulator declared its intention to create an 
independent national arbitration centre, with specific expertise for the settling of 
communications services B2C disputes, subject to the Ministry of Justice‟s approval.  
Though the specific workings of the arbitration centre are not yet published, the proposal 
followed an evaluation of CSP‟s IDR and aims at being an alternative to Courts, simpler 
and less expensive. In parallel, it strives to lessen costs associated with B2C complaint-
handling by the NRA
120
, but leaves current system inefficiencies unanswered
 121
. With an 
initially prognosticated budget of € 250 million122, it has since been amended to € 500 
million
123
, making the arbitration centre a costly solution and creating pressure for its 
efficiency to bring a return of the costs.    
5.4 Independent ADR bodies and NRAs 
The solutions so far proposed are pre-conditions to better ICT governance and 
sustainability, in view of a more efficient B2C ADR. Yet they leave unaddressed the issue 
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of contract-related complaints
124
, which constitute the bulk of complaints received by 
regulatory authorities. The continuous request by end-users‟ for NRAs‟ intervention, even 
when aware of the regulators‟ lack of powers, indicates a general perception of lack of 
efficient and effective means in the ECS market to handle this type of complaints.  
Truthfully NRAs are, as mentioned supra, in a privileged position to investigate and 
resolve ECS claims. Yet their official powers would dictate the procedures‟ dynamic125: 
NRAs would be bound to pursue public policy issues with priority over or even in 
detriment of the parties‟ positions126; their impartiality and integrity could be questioned 
through the motivation behind their decisions (especially when an indirect financial interest 
of the regulator or the state is involved
127
), and it would require a redesign of the 
regulators‟ purposes, powers and resources, to take in contractual and consumer disputes. 
Hence, though the traditional role of NRAs within B2C dispute resolution should be re-
evaluated, it would serve a better purpose by assisting in and complementing ADR than by 
emulating the judicial system.      
As it is, the complexity of the ECS market‟s relationships justifies the creation of a market-
specialised ADR body, with an experienced and appropriately trained staff of experts at its 
disposal. It is the solution being employed, to different extents, in the UK, Germany or 
Canada
128
, and currently pursued by Portugal.  
Such a body must be independent – from governments, NRAs, CSP, consumers and other 
market stakeholders alike. Independence is critical for impartiality and the two are crucial 
for accountability. However that does not exclude the possibility of incorporating a 
consultation office or organ, constituted by representatives of the different market interests, 
in order to voice their different concerns, advice on general policy or reform, and even for 
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non-binding consultation on specific proceedings. Then the body must fulfil a minimum set 
of standards and principles to guarantee accessibility, flexibility, autonomy and procedural 
fairness (Section 4.3).  
Because its specific legal nature can dictate very different solutions on its scope of powers 
and activity
129
, the following analysis will refrain from adhering to specific legal types, 
concentrating instead on its interrelation with the market‟s stakeholders. 
5.4.1 Main functions and interconnection with the ECS market 
The model here proposed anchors on the assumption that mechanisms like the complaint 
book would be eliminated, in order to optimise resources and the results of the proposed 
ADR. Nonetheless, if kept, the functioning of such mechanisms should be redesigned to 
allow complaints there lodged to be directly sent to the ADR body. Similarly, an ECMS 
along the lines of the above-described would enable NRAs receiving contract- and 
consumer-related complaints to create a rule to automatically forward them to the body. 
Both measures would attenuate inefficiencies. In the Portuguese case, and more so if the 
ADR centre is approved and the book kept, the deriving inefficiencies may only be 
overcome by a delegation of competences by ICP-ANACOM (either by keeping the 
processing of the complaints‟ data to itself and delegating on the centre the answering and 
solving of disputes, or by charging the arbitration centre with responsibility over the whole 
process and having it forwarding back complaints pertaining to its jurisdiction).  
5.4.1.1    Accessibility 
In harmony with the previous conclusions, complaint reception should be done primarily 
by electronic means (namely, by interconnecting an email or dynamic interface WCLF with 
an ECMS). These have the potential to decrease physical, social and territorial barriers. The 
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Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)‟s Uniform Dispute-
Resolution Policy
130
 (UDRP) is a clear example of the advantages of employing electronic-
based complaint procedures
131
. However helpline services and post reception should be 
kept available.  
Secondly, consumers should be required to resort to their CSP‟s IDR on a first instance. 
This will contribute to avoid complaint escalation to a conflict stage when CSP have not 
yet had an adequate opportunity to intervene. Hence access to the ADR body should be 
conditioned by demonstration of that attempt
132
. If no such effort was made, the ADR body 
(henceforth, Body) ought to automatically forward the complaint to the relevant CSP, 
whilst on cases of insufficient information and frivolous complaints, it should contact the 
complainant to request further information or provide an informative answer clarifying why 
the subject was deemed closed.  
Other type of access limitations, namely legitimacy issues, should be clear, publicised next 
to the general public and informed to complainants who don‟t fulfil the necessary 
requisites. Out-of-jurisdiction complaints would be automatically forward to the competent 
authority, when existent.  
5.4.1.2 Duties and proceedings 
The Body would be incumbent on analysing all complaints and logging their data. Hence 
the classification used by the NRA can be adopted here, facilitating data retrieval for 
statistic purposes and the homogenisation of approaches. Furthermore, logging will permit 
establishing a timeframe for resolution by CSP.  
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Consequently, the Body would forward a copy of the complaint to the respective CSP, 
notifying it/them of the proceedings and their general terms, and also to the NRA on 
alleged infraction cases. This paper suggests setting aside too strict procedural rules here, 
and allowing differentiating each case‟s handling based on how long-standing the 
complaint is and its complexity (though in the beginning this imprint of flexibility may 
cause some degree of inconsistency, it‟ll plausibly diminish as the process matures).      
Hence, depending on the complaint-subject, officers could determine, within a pre-set 
timeframe, a maximum period for either of the parties to report the complaint‟s resolution 
or for the CSP to provide evidence of the lack of facts supporting the claim. If the 
complaint wasn‟t formerly presented to the CSP, a wider timeframe should be applied than 
if the CSP was already aware of the complaint for 2 or more weeks or had deemed it 
deadlocked (irresolvable). Similarly, more complex cases should be given longer resolution 
timeframes than simpler complaints.  
The produce of evidence by electronic means and the carrying out of the procedure online 
should be a chief objective when designing and implementing the system. This entails the 
parties should be able to conduct the subsequent procedural phases via the Body‟s WCLF. 
Namely, CSP should respond using the platform; a well crafted response form will not only 
permit attaching evidence, but be concise and precise enough to enable the ECMS to 
collect the relevant information and automatically cross-check it with the data of the initial 
complaint. This not only facilitates the subsequent evaluation of the case, but most 
importantly permits the system to assist in the procedural steps. Accordingly, the system 
should be devised to automatically generate passwords linked to the claim for each of the 
parties, as they engage in the proceedings, including third parties
133
. This way the parties 
may inclusively access their personal data to update it and check on the proceedings‟ 
progress. To incentivise CSP to use the online platform to take part in the proceedings, a 
fee should be charged when resorting to more traditional methods, such as simple e-mail or 
post.     
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a) Burden of proof 
The burden of proof is here primarily set on the operators‟ sphere. It‟ll generally be simpler 
and less onerous for them to produce registries and other evidentiary data than for end-
users. Moreover, the evidence is necessary to substantiate the CSP‟s position, incentivising 
operators to cooperate in an efficient and timely manner.  
Hence, complainants will have the burden of persuasion, except where a shift of the burden 
of proof is required to address specific situations where that simplicity or burdening would 
be far greater for CSP than for end-users. It‟s the case of a non-payment dispute: it will be 
easier for end-users to prove they paid, than for CSP to demonstrate they didn‟t receive for 
their services. This shift mechanism ensures fairness and the equality of the parties, though 
evaluated and applied on a case-by-case basis.  
Other situations may amount to a negative burden of proof, but there too CSP are likelier in 
a better position to provide the necessary evidence. Examples of negative burden of proof 
exist in varied dispute resolution or litigation systems, such as the UDRP
134
, and can be 
counterbalanced, when adequate, by a shift of burden of proof, as described above.  
Legal presumptions might also play an important role. Consider a dispute over suspension 
of phone service for failure of payment. If the complainant alleges not having received a 
bill or notice of suspension, it may be complex for CSP to demonstrate they sent the bill(s) 
and/or notice(s). This may result in a statutory infraction procedure against the provider 
conducted by the NRA. Though operators can allege they regularly send out bills to their 
subscribers, according to a more or less automatic procedure, it may not suffice to disprove 
the claimant‟s allegation, especially if erroneous personal data (such as wrong name or 
address) is also disputed. In such cases, the establishment of legal presumptions, with an 
application limited to the Body‟s procedural system, may incentivise operators to introduce 
better business practices that safeguard their interests, alongside those of their subscribers. 
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Though legal presumptions can be disputed by disproving the presumed fact
135
, they can 
have an overall positive impact, both by accelerating proceedings and fomenting dispute 
prevention (by urging the adoption of better business procedures).   
After being notified of the complaint, operators may still opt to resolve the issue directly 
with the claimant. Oppositely, they may provide evidence contesting the claim. In that case, 
the staff will mediate, arbitrate or close the conflict, in accordance with their findings and 
the parties‟ willingness to review their position or the need to adjudicate a solution: 
a) No answer from CSP to the Body:  
New notice by the Body for CSP to relinquish evidence, within 5 working-days, to 
support their position or to comply with the claim (and here, the Body should have 
powers to change or partly dismiss the complaint, if it is clear part of it is 
unfounded or that, legally, the solution is different; similarly, it should review the 
pecuniary value of any compensation requested, if visibly inadequate and superior 
to what the produced evidence and the established facts indicate).  
If CSP comply, application of b) or c);  
If CSP do not comply, the evidence sought should be construed in favour of the 
claimant and the decision rendered according to the Body‟s evaluation of the 
fairness and merit of the claim.   
b) Notification of case closure to the Body by either of the parties (due to conciliation 
between them); 
c) Contest of claim by CSP, with produce of evidence:  
i. the Body may require the claimant to respond or produce further evidence to 
support his claim. If the claimant does not refute, the Body proceeds to rule 
by adjudication; if the claimant refutes, the Body attempts mediation if the 
facts or the evidence aren‟t clear and the parties are willing to review their 
position, or proceeds to arbitration.  
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Mediation: if one of the parties withdraws permission for mediation or no 
solution is reached after 1 month – adjudication procedure. 
Adjudication: Each party chooses a panellist-member, with the Body 
assigning the third member, or the parties agree to adjudication by a one 
member panellist, assigned by the Body. Before a final ruling, it should 
communicate to the parties which facts were proven, disproved or remained 
unclear. Or 
ii. If the facts are clear – adjudicatory decision136. 
All decisions should be duly substantiated, explained and communicated to both parties, 
preferably through electronic means so as to permit record of the transmission data (the 
same should apply to other notifications during the proceedings).    
When complaints are found in favour of end-users, CSP are notified, along with the 
decision, of the period for compliance and the consequences of non-compliance. Once past 
that period and if no review or appeal notifications are presented to the Body, the non-
compliance is communicated to the NRA and the CSP. The NRA then initiates a regulatory 
infraction procedure for non-compliance and, if alleged by CSP, verifies the observation of 
procedural rules by the Body. If no due process flaws are found, the NRA issues an order to 
enact the decision, levying a fine for non-compliance.  
This requires a statutory empowerment of NRAs to check the observation of procedural 
rules by the Body and oversee compliance with its decisions. Because there‟s no merit 
review, it does not require a change of the NRA‟s competences towards consumer 
protection and B2C dispute, nor does it compromise the Body‟s independence and 
autonomy.  
In the Portuguese case, ICP-ANACOM is empowered, under its Statutes, Article 16(3), to 
“recommend or determine to the concessionary or licensed entities the necessary steps to be 
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taken to resolve just complaints by users.”137 Hence the NRA can voice opinions on 
complaint-handling by CSP and may advise the creation of a specialised ADR body, with 
mandatory membership by CSP. Consequently, though requiring a specific attribution of 
powers to act, the ICP-ANACOM‟s review of due process compliance by the Body may be 
justified under that norm.  
In turn, in the United Kingdom (UK), Ofcom has implemented the obligation for all CSP to 
adhere to an Ofcom-approved ADR scheme, in addition to complying with the Ofcom-
approved Complaint-Handling Code of Practice. These ADR schemes are to be free of 
charge, transparent, effective and be easy to use
138
 by consumers
139
. So far, Ofcom 
approved two ADR schemes: the Office of The Telecommunications Ombudsman 
(OTELO) and the Communications and Internet Services Adjudication (CISAS)
140
. Both 
are fully independent of CSP and Ofcom. “If a complaint has not been resolved within 
eight weeks (or the C[S]P acknowledges the complaint is „deadlocked‟), a consumer can 
make an application to the relevant ADR scheme”, “which has the authority to examine the 
case and make an appropriate judgment[. This] could potentially include a financial award 
and/or requiring the C[S]P to take necessary action. While C[S]Ps are bound by the 
decisions of the ADR schemes, consumers still have the ability to pursue their dispute 
through the legal system if they remain unsatisfied with their outcome” 141. For each 
referral to ADR, the complained CSP pays a pre-established fee. The schemes have rules in 
place to reject frivolous and vexatious complaints, thus curbing abuses by complainants.     
Conversely, in Germany, RegTP offers a B2C conciliation scheme
142
, under the 
Telekommunikationsgesetz 2004 §47a (TKG), open to written complaints alleging contract 
breach of statutory rights granted to consumers, if no judicial or other ADR proceedings 
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concerning the same matter are pending. The procedure, established in SchilO2008
143
, is 
voluntary and ends when either of the parties decides to step down. If the proceeding 
succeeds, a non-binding well grounded agreement is issued, based on the evidence 
provided, the law and the parties‟ statements. Proceedings may be turned official if 
evidence of practice of a statutory infraction is brought to light. To ensure the seriousness 
of the complaint, procedures are subject to a fee payment, gradated according to the 
complaint‟s value144, which is divided between both parties and payable once the defendant 
agrees to take part. Interestingly, it has been noticed end-users are more willing to make 
use of online tools and carry the proceedings electronically than CSP
145
. 
Germany‟s approach focuses on the voluntariness of the parties‟ participation, merged with 
an active engagement by the NRA itself on the resolution of the complaints which fulfil the 
scheme‟s criteria. The UK‟s, on the other hand, puts emphasis on ensuring a normative 
minimum to safeguard complainants, despite the nature of the complaint, by establishing 
mandatory membership by CSP, approving the authorised ADR schemes and the gratuity 
of the proceedings for end-users. Both require a previous attempt by claimants to address 
the issue with their operators. 
There are consequences to these divergent approaches. Within the German context, the 
number of complaints being brought to conciliation represents a minute margin of the total 
of complaints (516 out of 44660 complaints, in 2008,
146
 for example), and a large 
percentage of these either fail to fulfil the admission criteria or to gather consent to 
participate by CSP
147
. The disparity between the total of complaints and those reaching 
conciliation has resulted in the Agency being increasingly “required to take unrestricted 
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action as an ombudsman”148. Subsequently its scope of action has been the object of 
discussion
149
. RegTP‟s scheme represents, nonetheless, a positive departure from 
traditional conceptions of communications NRAs‟ role concerning B2C. Its active 
participation in the dispute resolution itself, though in very limited terms, may constitute a 
beacon for future legislative reforms in the EU.    
Oppositely, the UK‟s more complex structure encompasses consumer/contractual 
complaints, which is of the utmost relevance as these tend to constitute the chief part of 
registered complaints (both with CSP and NRAs) and likely have considerable economical 
significance (though no values were available for the British market, the matters in dispute 
registered in 2007
150
 by RegTP amounted to € 81,930). However the system in place raises 
concerns of “forum shopping”, as CSP are free to choose between the available approved 
ADR schemes; it keeps the NRA at a distance of the procedures, intervening only in 
statutory infraction cases, and denies CSP external review or appeal. 
The structure here proposed attempts to enclose the positive experiences of different 
systems. Simultaneously, it strives to correct the inefficiencies derived of the segmentation 
of roles within the European ECS market‟s B2C dispute settlement. For that purpose, the 
Body‟s legitimacy and performance require:  
- The attribution of powers to handle contract and consumer B2C disputes, amongst 
others that may be specified, within the ECS sector, and to dismiss or close cases with 
no legal ground or where bad faith is proven (the proceedings should contemplate a 
“bad faith sanction”, conducive to the application of a warning or the payment of a 
fine); 
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- Procedural rules setting distinct timeframes in accordance to the complaints‟ subject 
(classification of content), for producing evidence and for the subsequent procedural 
phases. A subsidiary timeframe should be determined for subjects not fitting the 
specified typology (without preclusion of extension when justified by the facts‟ 
complexity). The procedural policy and rules should be sent to all CSPs prior to the 
Body‟s beginning of functions, and subsequently to all new operators, and be kept 
available online; 
- Attribution of powers to investigate claims and request evidence from both parties; 
- Mandatory participation or membership by CSP;  
- Binding nature and enforceability of decisions. Merit review should be limited to a 
special internal panellist and appeal to Courts; 
- Expected timeframe(s) for reaching a decision;  
- Effective “self-enforcement” mechanisms (bad faith penalties; case ruling despite no 
response or relinquishing of evidence by the parties; publishing statistics on CSP‟s 
cooperation, ranking CSP‟s by highest number of complaints – per subject or in total –  
or with the averagely longest standing complaints
151
, etc),  and 
- Oversight mechanisms through official channels (ability to report to NRA cases of non-
compliance by CSP with final decisions; the non-compliance must therefore constitute 
an infraction under the NRAs‟ jurisdiction).  
 
b) Confidentiality 
Essential to build the parties‟ trust, willingness to participate and cooperation, 
confidentiality would be severely compromised if the parties feared a report to either the 
NRA (for example, of infractions by CSP or of situations contending with public policy 
issues) or other authorities. Hence past the initial moment of forwarding complaints 
pointing to alleged infractions as they are reported by end-users, the Body should assure the 
parties the confidentiality of the proceedings. It is relevant to procedurally specify which 
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aspects fall under this secrecy and any limitations in place (e.g., disclosure of information 
relevant to public health and safety hazards).  
c) Precedent 
Precedent
152
 increases legal certainty and predictability. Yet its creation should not be 
demanded of ADR systems as it is of Courts. Because it requires the publicity of decisions, 
precedent would compromise the private nature of ADR proceedings and introduce rigidity 
regarding the possible outcomes and, even, regarding procedural formalities. This can 
potentially diminish ADR‟s efficiency and appeal to the parties. On the other hand, it 
would imply reshaping the purposes of ADR. ADR systems do not aim at building binding 
case law, but at solving disputes swiftly according to the parties‟ needs and interests, whilst 
observing their legal rights.   
Within the presented model, with the exception of potential negotiated settlements based on 
the parties‟ personal interests, the Body is bound by statutory and regulatory law 
concerning the parties‟ rights and obligations, and is obliged to verify and uphold 
contractual compliance. Furthermore its decisions are susceptible of procedural review by 
the NRA and of appeal to the judicial system. This contributes to ensuring procedural 
fairness. 
Nonetheless, it is possible to strengthen ADR regulation by improving transparency, where 
it does not contend with confidentiality. The Body should, namely: 
- substantiate its decisions, even when these result from an “automatic” application of 
regulatory or contractual norms, including breaking down and explaining any attributed 
compensation;  
- issue “explanatory memorandums”153, clarifying the Body‟s interpretation of its own 
internal rules, of how it may be expected to deal with certain matters, what type of 
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cooperation it expects from the parties, of its understanding of what may constitute bad 
faith by the parties, etc; 
- keep a public listing of decisions relevant for future disputes, for and limited to their  
addressing of procedural rules, of the parties‟ legitimacy, the decision‟s enforceability and 
remedy awarding, or concerning substantive rights and obligations of the parties or 
contractual interpretation by the Body which transcend the specific case, etc;  
- keep and publish statistics concerning its performance: e.g., number of complaint entries, 
on common contents, on cases solved without active collaboration from operators, on cases 
entirely conducted via the WCLF (i.e., online), average time for resolution, etc, and 
- keep and publish statistics on non-compliance by CSP, of cases reviewed or appealed, and 
of decisions overthrown. 
 
It is also conceivable that statistics on CSPs‟ “good practice examples” within the 
proceedings should be kept, both as a boosting benchmark and a promoter of consumer 
awareness on overall quality of service. It could namely highlight the fastest settlement-
achieving operators or those with consumer-friendliest approaches (regarding relinquishing 
of evidence, customer care‟s openness to cooperate with the Body or the complainant...). 
This contrasts with the statistics gathered for leveraging “self-enforcement” by the Body. 
 
To finalise, a few considerations are required on the nature and legal force of the Body‟s 
decisions. As no preference was taken as to the Body‟s legal form154, the discussion of its 
legal status has to be connected to its purposes and activities. The Body provides a dispute 
settlement system, guided by and bound to legal principles and procedural rules which aim 
at ensuring the Body performs its functions adequately and in a way analogous to a court of 
law. The exceptions are a consequence of specificities resultant from more flexible and 
speedier proceedings. There are drawbacks, namely on due process and fair trial assurance, 
yet these can be answered through additional procedural safeguards, through choices made 
on the structure of the system and through regulation. Further, the Body applies substantive 
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law and upholds contractual compliance, as mentioned above. Thus, the Body can be 
perceived as a forefront of the traditional court system, increasing access to justice.  
 
The nature and legal value of its decisions must, therefore, be supportive of this view. The 
Body‟s decisions are not administrative decisions but analogous to judicial decisions. Its 
procedures are structured to result in a binding solution: when negotiation or mediation is 
successful, a binding agreement is drawn. This agreement, private in nature, should be 
enforceable both through the Body‟s mechanisms and courts155. When they fail to succeed 
or the parties opt to not participate in negotiation or mediation proceedings, a binding 
adjudicatory decision ensues. Though limitations were established regarding the creation of 
precedent and to uphold some degree of confidentiality, which contrasts with the openness 
of published court decisions, other transparency-enhancing measures were put in place. 
Firstly, it should be noticed that even concerning the judicial system, there is a principle of 
secrecy of justice prevailing, when applicable, over the principle of open justice (think for 
example of court-approved secrecy agreements or court cases which involve especially 
sensitive matters concerning the parties)
156
. Secondly, the Body publishes varied statistical 
data and keeps a publicly available database of its decisions or parts of decisions carrying 
future relevance, including its explanatory memorandums. These published elements aim 
not only at enhancing transparency or informing and educating consumers, but also at 
being used as future reference (for example, for future citation either by the Body or one of 
the parties). While explanatory memorandums are fully binding for the Body, its previous 
decisions are not but should only be disregarded when, through a special effort of 
substantiation, the Body demonstrates that in a new case the ratio decidendi cannot be the 
same
157
. Once more, it highlights the importance for the Body to clearly and fully 
substantiate its decisions, namely as a disincentive to reviews and appeals. The resulting 
growing body of decisions will over time contribute to a lessening of inconsistencies and to 
                                                 
155
 This underlines the need to make the Body‟s decisions recognisable and homologated by a court, if a 
judicial appeal is brought about. 
156
 An evidence of this is Bill 623, presented to the US Senate and nicknamed „Sunshine in Litigation Act 
2011‟, which attempts to limit the possible scope of judicial secrecy. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/query/z?c112:S.623.IS:# 
157
 It is an expression of jurisprudence constante: Black‟s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, p.2501. 
  61 
a fairer and equal treatment in future cases. On a parallel point, there is a need to make the 
search engine for this database user-friendly and accessible in the senses discussed above. 
Externally, the Body‟s decisions legal value is touched upon in Section 5.5.           
 
d) Reporting  
 
There is some degree of reporting to the NRA within the system, as a consequence of the 
periodical sending of statistical data on complaints and the Body‟s performance.  
Additionally, consideration may be given to establishing a duty for the Body to respond to 
clarification requests by the NRA on the statistical data or even to information queries, 
insofar as they do not compromise the Body‟s independence or the proceedings‟ 
confidentiality.  This is desirable for its potential to enhance the transparency of the Body‟s 
procedures and increase its de facto legitimacy (including its trustworthiness with 
consumers).  
On the other hand, the NRA may intervene in the procedures as a third party, namely by 
providing evidence or by invitation, with the parties consent; it carries out procedural 
oversight, and contributes to the enforcement of the Body‟s decisions. It is these 
participations which require especial prescriptive guidance. Though its review is merely 
procedural, the NRA is not bound by the Body‟s findings or decisions, meaning it may opt 
to initiate its own procedures on the account of substantive matters of its competence. This 
may translate itself into an investigation of possible statutory non-compliance by the CSP 
or issues where the NRA understands pressing public interests to be at stake. A possible 
conduct to adopt here is creating a “notice of interest”, by which the NRA in a 
substantiated manner informs the Body, respectively, of its need to access the initial 
complaint
158
 (and possibly other initial complaints reporting the same incident), or of the 
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 It presumes there were no initial signs of a statutory infraction in the compliant that initiated the 
proceedings; otherwise the Body would have been bound to forward a copy of the complaint to the NRA after 
receiving it. From the initial complaint on, the procedure‟s confidentiality should prevail. Notice this does not 
incapacitate the NRA from investigate and require further evidence from the parties. 
  62 
reasons for its concerns and the public order or policy issues it believes deserving further 
consideration by the Body
159
.   
 
e) Funding 
 
The discussion of implementation costs and their allocation exceeds the scope of this paper. 
Yet a brief rundown of the concerns surrounding funding is of relevance, due to possible 
implications on the Body‟s independence and impartiality.  
 
Funding may be guaranteed through business or governmental sponsorship. Opting for 
governmental funding may avoid some of the market pressure business sponsorship entails 
(namely, business-friendly outcomes due to economic dependence), but it puts further 
strain on public spending. In addition, it may pose an obstacle to the development of 
private initiatives connected to ADR (e.g., clearing houses, accreditation mechanisms, 
trustmark programs, etc), just as governments and other public entities may have interests 
at play (namely, shareholding in a CSP, public policy issues or political agendas).  
Hence, public funding may not only be the source of similar concerns to those expressed 
about business sponsorship, but further implies significant public economic burdening. 
Thus, business funding offers better solutions, so long as prescriptive safeguards are in 
place to address transparency, impartiality and independence concerns ensuing from market 
pressure. Those safeguards should aim at ensuring good practice and may depend on the 
specifications of the funding method:  
 through access to ADR (e.g., UK and Germany). It raises concerns on: 
                                                 
159
 Not that the Body is bound to observe and implement any measures pursuant to the concerns expressed by 
the NRA, since it is not its role to oversight public policies but the interests of the parties in light of their will 
and the applicable norms, nor will this result in a change of the substantive decision in question. Yet it may 
provide future guidance and analysis in new cases. This advisory function may be facilitated when the Body 
includes a consultation office or organ, as mentioned in Section 5.4. 
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- affordability (too high a fee-value may deter or be an impediment for the parties to 
adhere or participate, or may prove disproportional in light of the redress sought), 
and 
- abuse (too low a fee may entice procedural abuse and vexatious or frivolous 
complaints).  
More specifically, a pre-stipulated fee as used in the UK fails to take into account specific 
procedural spending (which may diverge greatly according to which phase the proceedings 
are taking into) and case-value. Additionally, the system burdens CSP only. Though as 
referred above CSP may be expected to improve their IDR procedures to avoid the ADR 
referral cost, there is no control mechanism ensuring consumers do not abuse their means 
of redress either
160
. In turn, the German system applies a fee that is gradated according to 
the complaint‟s value and divides it equally between the parties. This may represent an 
impediment to economically disadvantaged end-users, while, at the same time, an equal 
division of the fee does not necessarily amount to an equitable solution.   
 through industry-based criteria. For example, that all or some CSP must contribute and 
in which proportion (equally or gradated according to their earnings).  
The most noticeable disadvantage here is the loss of a link between the funding and the 
registered complaints, i.e., the loss of accountability, which may be further aggravated 
by the exclusion of certain CSP (see Canadian example, next). In fact, smaller CSP may 
lack the incentive to establish or improve customer service and IDR due to not sharing 
in on the ADR costs. Similarly, it may overburden major CSP, without it reflecting 
either the quality of (or investment in) their IDR or the (dis)satisfaction concerning 
their services. More so, though compulsory membership might curb some of the market 
pressure
161
, it does not eliminate the risk of industry-favouring decisions, potentially 
undermining the ADR system‟s integrity and credibility. This can only be achieved, as 
                                                 
160
 There is some control of the complaints‟ seriousness by the schemes‟ ability to refuse vexatious or 
frivolous complaints, but there is no clear guidance as to what may be refused and under what grounds. 
161
 See e-Bay case reported in Bygrave (2002), p.9.  
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mentioned, through specific provisions cautioning those fears, observation of due 
process and increasing transparency. 
 through mixed criteria. This may include a conjugation of the above mentioned criteria 
or even others, making a critical analysis possible only on a system-basis.   
On creating the Commissioner for Complaints for Telecommunications Services
162
, the 
Canadian NRA
163
 opted for industry-based “financial contribution”, imposing a 
mandatory membership of 3 years
164
 for all CSP whose annual revenues exceeded $10 
million. The funding is determined according to a proportion-rate
165
 and encompasses 
both an annual fee and a complaint-based fee (complaints registered per CSP).  
 
For this paper‟s purposes, a mixed criteria method, which simultaneously awards efficiency 
and dispute prevention, is preferred: 
 compulsory participation of all CSP in the funding, so as to avoid free-riders and lack 
of incentive for IDR improvement. Because membership is also mandatory, it further 
avoids market pressure connected to forum shopping; 
 an annual fee, as applied in Canada, may be conceivable especially in the early stages 
of  implementation of the Body, but should be progressively abandoned in favour of 
complaint-related fee(s), as to reinforce accountability and also proactive measures by 
CSP; 
 any applicable fee should be independent of the dispute‟s outcome and cost-oriented 
- the Body should aim at keeping costs low, by providing efficient resolution – 
namely, improving procedural costs by optimising its ICT tools (using open 
source software, customising the WCLF and the ECMS), by employing 
automatic resolution where possible, by observing due process and providing 
                                                 
162
 The independent consumer agency in charge with resolving consumer complaints. See Order in Council 
P.C. 2007-533, 4 April 2007, Telecom Public Notice CRTC 2007-16, of 22 August, and Telecom Decision 
CRTC 2007-130, 20 December 2007. http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2007/dt2007-130.htm. Also: 
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2007/pt2007-16.htm 
163
 The Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission. 
164
 Revisable after that period. 
165
 “The Commission (...) considers that (...) the TSP with the direct consumer relationship should be 
accountable to the complainant”. http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2007/dt2007-130.htm, paragraphs 30-35.  
http://www.ccts-cprst.ca/en/about/structure-and-funding  
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well-substantiated decisions (as to deter reviews and appeals), by filtrating and 
excluding vexatious and frivolous complaints (disregarding them equally on 
determining the complaints‟ numbers used to establish fees), and by making 
adequate use of available mechanisms to deal with procedural abuse (e.g., bad 
faith penalties); 
- the applicable fee should concern the number of complaints registered per CSP 
and, though it should disregard the outcome, it should reward case resolution at 
an earlier stage of the proceedings, by way of a reduced fee; 
- administration fees or cost sharing should be applied to end-users in cases 
where procedural bad faith is ruled against them
166
. 
5.5 Beyond the opening performance: an anticipation of the system’s evolution 
The proposed model might be susceptible of criticism for not entailing a solution that is 
friendlier towards privatisation of ADR. Yet such considerations disregard both the 
system‟s purposes and aim. Access to justice is a corner stone of a democratic state of law 
and a constant policy-making concern. Within the EU, it finds provision in numerous 
community and national legislation
167
 and is this proposal‟s foremost purpose and aim. Just 
as discussed above about industry initiatives with respect to consumer needs
168
, there are 
also situations that private ADR might not feel sufficient incentive or market pressure to 
address (namely, where profit is unlikely or too low to justify the investment).  
Thus effective access to justice is sought through the implementation of a system carried 
out by an independent entity and which is strongly anchored and shaped by public 
incumbencies, powers and rules but is flexible enough and responsive to the evolution of 
                                                 
166
 The reason why otherwise a fee payable by end-users is excluded relates to emphasising the special 
position CSP find themselves in to address and resolve the complaints, while consumers often lack bargaining 
power to make themselves heard. Additionally, a consumer who feels satisfied with the way his complaint 
was handled and feels his concerns were addressed, is less likely to resort to ADR, even if the outcome was 
unfavourable to him. Ofcom (2010), 5.12-5.21.  
167
 Including EU Treaty, Article 65(2)(e) (with subparagraph (g) provisioning the adoption of measures for 
the development of “alternative methods of dispute settlement”); the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, Article 47, and the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 6. 
168
 See Section 2.1-2.1.3. 
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the market. Furthermore, by accounting consumers as active participants in the process, this 
ADR proposal empowers them, enhancing consumer confidence in the system and in the 
market.   
Nonetheless, the proposal is intended as an initial roll-out and does not stand as an 
impediment to the development of solutions by the private sector, whether by the 
communications industry or through the surge of an ADR “industry”. In fact, it welcomes 
it, as it has the potential to complement its proactive goals. From examples occurring in e-
commerce ODR
169
, it may be guessed that private initiatives in the ECS context will also 
embrace accreditation mechanisms and affiliation programs, i.e., trustmarks, alongside 
ADR provision increasingly moulded by ICT development. In tune with previous 
considerations, then, they should aim at intervene to prevent complaints from escalating 
into litigation, acting as an “extension” of CSP‟s IDR and being resorted to in a moment 
previous to the registering of the complaint with the Body.          
A recent academic dissertation pointed to the need to resort to government regulation to 
achieve neutrality and thus create functional equivalence between traditional ADR and 
electronic ADR
170
 (henceforth, e-ADR), through implementation of a core set of principles 
that, once complied with, will create similar procedural and substantive guarantees to those 
found in offline dispute settlement environments
171
. Another academic work pointed to the 
need to “[design] a regulatory model [to] set legal standards for mandatory ODR, (...) 
create a pan-European trustmark (...) granted to [complying] ODR providers [and 
implement compliance monitoring by co-operation] between national and regional 
authorities through the European Consumer Centres Network (ECC-Net)”172.    
Though some further regulation is indeed desirable, it should be tailored to address the 
specific characteristics of the implemented ADR, i.e., be prescriptive (as opposed to 
                                                 
169
 Kaufmann-Kohler and Schultz (2004); Menkel-Meadow (2003). 
170
 Whether private or public ADR. 
171
 Schiavetta (2008). 
172
 Cortés, “Developing...” (2010), p. 1. While in his dissertation (Cortés, “Online...”, 2010) the author 
proposed this statutory intervention via a Directive, in this article the preference falls on a Regulation act.   
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providing mere guidelines) and establish normative minimums that eliminate or lessen 
inherent shortcomings or vulnerabilities of the system. Simultaneously, it should not hinder 
the system‟s benefits and potential development. Where there is a need to improve 
procedural or substantive guarantees in ADR that transcends traditional ADR, regulatory 
change should not aim at establishing functional equivalence per se, but at ensuring that 
those differences do not result in a distortion of the system‟s objectives (access to justice 
and dispute settlement) or of general principles of law (namely, connected to security 
requirements
173
, rule of law, due process and impartiality, enforcement and cross-border 
issues
174
).  
The fact that there seems to be broad consensus regarding the desirable core principles and 
standards applicable to ADR
175
, including e-ADR, is a testament of the acquaintance by 
international, national and supranational bodies and governments with the key issues 
surrounding ADR and of accord as to the direction to take when implementing them. It 
attests to the possibility of harmonisation. 
Thus, the implementation in every EU Member-State of a model identical to the one 
described or, when other systems are already in place, the harmonisation of their powers 
and scope of action with those of the depicted model, would permit establishing similar 
work practices, achieve similar access to justice and therefore homogenous consumer 
protection, and enhance the sharing of information and experiences between the Bodies.  
The creation of a common database for decisions, including explanatory memorandums, 
and statistics would likewise potentiate the outlining of best practices and benchmarking. 
As all Bodies would be subject to identical confidentiality requirements regarding the 
parties and specific rewards attributed, it is unlikely that confidentiality breaches would 
occur. On the other hand, the awareness that its decisions would be open to scrutiny by its 
peers is likely to further commit an individual Body to especially substantiate and explain 
each decision.  
                                                 
173
 See note 83. 
174
 E.g., conflict of laws, decision recognition and enforcement. 
175
 Bygrave (2002), p8. 
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Though the database does not pretend to emulate the creation of precedent amongst the 
national Bodies, it can nevertheless contribute to clarifying doubts, homogenising 
experiences and increasing the level of predictability of decisions. It highlights the need for 
collaboration and a concatenation of efforts by the Bodies to serve identical justice within 
the EU internal market, as another Body‟s decision is not binding for the remainder.  
Should there be a want to submit the Bodies to a monitoring system, it should not trespass 
the limitations already applicable on a national level. If there is evidence of inappropriate 
use of power by a Body, Member-States have traditional legal tools available to address it. 
Hence, it might be preferable to conceive a consulting and collaborative system 
overarching the Bodies. This role could be played either by national and regional 
authorities through the ECC-Net or by the Body of European Regulators for Electronic 
Communications (BEREC)
176
 and would mostly relate to improving the Bodies‟ 
performances by giving guidance and clarification on new legislation, advising on market 
and consumer concerns and facilitating harmonisation of procedures and dispute 
settlement.  
The increased advantage to establishing this direct connection and collaboration between 
the different national Bodies and then also BEREC, for example, is that it may attenuate the 
obstacles and ease the enforcement of decisions in other national territories. By being able 
to immediately and directly access a decision, other Bodies may be able to use their own 
enforcement mechanisms to speed-up compliance with it.  
The specifics of this strengthened collaboration should be the object of regulation or at 
least of a code of conduct between the national Bodies. Such rules need to address, 
amongst other aspects, the procedures to comply with amongst the Bodies to request 
enforcement in another Member-State‟s territory, any limits to that enforcement, and how 
to proceed if a Body refuses to enforce a decision by another peer due to disagreement 
                                                 
176
 Established by Regulation (EC) No 1211/2009, BEREC aims at providing a framework for cooperation 
between NRAs and could therefore use its expertise to further promote homogenisation and collaboration 
between the Bodies as well.   
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(whether resulting from the lack of formal elements, such as substantiation of the decision, 
or a disagreement regarding the content or direction of the decision)
177
.       
Finally, and despite the fact that specific issues concerning cross-border disputes transcend 
the more general scope of this paper, it is proposed here, at least regarding the majority of 
the disputes, that the Bodies may stipulate as a preemptive choice of law the law of the 
jurisdiction corresponding to where the service is normally provided. The reason for this is 
that, in the EU at least, CSP are required to get a license in order to provide services within 
a Member-State‟s territory. Hence there will likely be a connection of both the end-user 
and the CSP to the territory where the service is provided and thus to the corresponding 
jurisdiction. It will also, for most cases, mean that the national Body is the most indicated 
to solve the dispute. This preemptive criterion eliminates forum shopping and will 
generally find a connection with the parties‟ expectations. Where the parties do not desire 
that jurisdiction to apply, they may for example resort to private ADR or, if both agree, 
present the complaint to a different national Body (as long as competent in accordance to 
the applicable private international law rules). It is also advisable, therefore, that besides 
the two contractual parties, the consumer on whose behalf a services provision contract 
might have been made should also be given legitimacy to present a complaint.    
 
  
                                                 
177
 The same could be said of collaboration with other ADR systems, such as the pan-European online small 
claims procedure, by way of recognising a national Body‟s decisions and seeking to enforce them (when a 
monetary remedy has been awarded to the claimant). 
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6 Completing the partiture: proactive dispute prevention 
The previous sections outlined a B2C complaint-handling scheme based on an increased 
use of new technologies, conciliated with employed models and focusing on surfacing 
trends and best-practice examples. It aims at qualitative
178
 as much as quantitative 
improvement. Similarly it hopes to boost B2C ADR within the ECS sector to generalised 
practice, while being forward-looking to not constrain either future development, a 
harmonisation of B2C ADR procedures within the EU or even extension to disputes where 
end-users are the respondent.  It has the potential to facilitate the exchange of data and of 
best-practice models between equivalent bodies within other EU Member-States, as well as 
increase accessibility to the data by NRAs or other organisations in outlying areas.   
On analysing the reasons behind the rising levels of consumer complaints, accompanied by 
a decrease of information queries, the following conclusions were drawn:  
a) Consumers are aware of their role within a competition-based market, demanding 
ever greater quality of service (including customer service);   
b) Though more empowered, consumers still often feel the frustration of not having 
their position acknowledged or of lengthy and stressful dealings with their CSP to 
achieve a solution in a conflict situation. This is aggravated by the sense of absence 
of speedy and comprehensive dispute-settlement mechanisms to pursue their 
resolution or pressure CSP to address those complaints; 
c) The growing availability of information requires ICT systems to guide users 
throughout complaint-lodging, and 
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 Paraphrasing Bing and Harvold (1977), p.225: “[N]ew technology represents a basic change influencing 
(...) habits. Comparing the [actions and results available] before and after the introduction of the new 
technology, one will find a difference in quality. A different type of [processing and/or use of data] is 
conducted”.  
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d) The availability, accessibility and user-friendliness of ICT systems encourage their 
use. 
The suggested model answers consumers‟ concerns by offering accessibility and guidance 
on lodging a complaint. Furthermore it provides an immediate automated reply that 
connects users to relevant information about their contracts and the procedures ahead. By 
acquainting end-users with their rights and adequate redress-mechanisms, it effectively 
empowers them and decreases inefficiencies and resources‟ misuse.  
Finally the ICT design is thought out to add functionality. It not only contributes to 
optimising the cases‟ life cycle, but it makes the system itself a tool of both the handling 
and the resolution of simple disputes, where a determination of the compensation or award 
can be carried out automatically. It lends efficacy to the contract‟s enforcement.   
Simultaneously IDR development by CSP is encouraged, by remaining a pre-requisite of 
access to the ADR mechanism. If no IDR is in place, operators dispense the opportunity to 
solve the complaint without external interference (and additional costs). These measures 
aim at proactively prevent disputes. 
The system is then conducive to the effective resolution of the disputes, i.e., the decisions 
are binding and enforceable. Because the ADR is conducted by a Body other than the 
NRA, it allows the regulatory authority to maintain itself aside the proceedings, warding its 
impartiality and reputation.  
However, the system does not dispense NRAs from a more active participation. They can 
lend it effectiveness by overseeing compliance by CSP through their own channels and can 
be called to monitor the quality of the services provided by the ADR Body. This 
monitoring may be done through the procedural review in place and through statistic 
analysis of the number of reviews received, of cases where formal procedures where not 
respected, and even of complaints lodged against the Body.  NRAs can potentially even 
function as an accreditation entity regarding the Body, in a similar way to that being done 
in the UK.  
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As a corollary, the paper focused on the relevance of contract certainty, as a contributing 
factor to compliance and risk management frameworks. Less legalistic and more consumer-
friendly contract-forms may prove valuable assets for all stakeholders.  
Nevertheless, policy certainty and transparency is first and foremost an overarching vertical 
issue. The legal framework of the EU communications market must provide clear 
directions, not just for consumer protection, but as a tool for good governance and effective 
implementation and compliance. This is essential for conflict prevention. Likely with this 
in mind, recent changes
179
 have equiparated the minimum protection for end-users 
applicable to internet and television services
180
 to that already existent for phone services. 
It attests to the realisation that the notion of universal service does not contend with a 
common minimum core of rights. Yet some discrepancies remain (e.g., only the suspension 
of phone services for non-payment of bills is required to be preceded by a notice of 
suspension
181
), which should also be addressed.   
Similarly, the classification of Voice over IP (VoIP), a voice service provided over the 
internet, as an internet service instead of a phone service (due to its analogous functions), 
excludes it from the regime of universal service. This has consequences not always evident 
to consumers and is difficult to concatenate with notions of technological neutrality and 
substitutability of services, both competition enhancers
182
.  
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 See amendments introduced to the Universal Service Directive by Directive 2009/136/EC (Cookies 
Directive). 
180
 Until this amendment, the unilateral modification of television and internet contracts by a CSP was 
excluded of regulation apart from national contract law, and therefore deprived of a statutory sanction. 
181
 Universal Service Directive, Recital 16 and Article 10(2), in conjunction with Annex I, Part A, e). In 
Portugal, this obligation was stipulated regarding other electronic services as well, by Law 5/2004, Article 
39(2)(a), but it failed to be introduced to EU legislation (see previous note).   
182
 The argument that VoIP cannot be a phone service due to the difficulty of tracking the VoIP number‟s 
location on an emergency call situation is only partially valid. This requirement [Universal Directive, Article 
26(3)] is no impediment when the VoIP service is associated by contract with a unique geographical address.  
These VoIP numbers are included on the national numbering plan; they are susceptible of inclusion on phone 
directories and can access enquiry services. Hence the obstacle only arises when the service is provided via 
wireless technology. Yet as technology evolves, it will undoubtedly become easier to suppress that difficulty. 
Furthermore, the amendments introduced by the Cookies Directive to the Universal Service Directive, Article 
20(1)(b), first paragraph, and Article 26(2) (where the expression “electronic communications service” is 
used) seem to point towards this change. Either way, at least with regard to VoIP service which satisfies legal 
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6.1 Challenges present and future 
Further development of B2C ADR will continue to raise questions on: 
- equity and consumer voicing, especially within developing countries; 
 - effective enforcement, both on national and cross-border disputes (with ODR showing 
here great promises of flexibility, dematerialisation and speed
183
), and 
- resources optimisation, including decreasing IT carbon footprint.  
New products and services will keep changing behaviours and consumer expectations and 
new hybrids of ADR will likely be set in practice.   
Until present, investment on ADR development has focused mainly on B2B disputes
184
, 
with the support of international bodies, such as the World Bank and OECD
185
, and even 
countries like the USA, encouraging the surging of a business of dispute providers
186
. This 
has lead to the emergence of: 
- clearing houses – intermediary bodies between the potential claimants and the dispute 
providers, assisting the parties in choosing the most appropriate provider for their dispute 
and in initialising the process; this referral has been labelled as a “control of quality” 
mechanism of available providers, but has also raised questions of potential favouring of 
some providers
187
; 
                                                                                                                                                    
requirements applicable to phone service, there is no substantiated reason to not encompass it under a more 
extensive protection, as that available for universal service.   
183
 Kaufmann-Kohler and Schultz (2004). 
184
 Of which ADR associated to International Investment Agreements has gained increasing prominence - 
http://investmentadr.wlu.edu/resources/page.asp?pageid=592 
185
 http://rru.worldbank.org/Documents/Toolkits/adr/adr_fulltoolkit.pdf . Other examples of initiatives and 
further reading: http://www.oecd.org/searchResult/0,3400,en_2825_293564_1_1_1_1_1,00.html  
186
 E.g., http://www.abanet.org/dispute/home.html   
187
 Kaufmann-Kohler and Schultz (2004). 
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- of an increasingly specialised offer of ADR services, associated with a privatisation of 
dispute resolution, and the inherent risk of “pick and choose” and “forum shopping”,  when 
more than one ADR system or set of rules is susceptible of application
188
, 
- accreditation and appellate mechanisms to exert control over private ADR bodies, etc. 
Much could be said about each of these points and the contribution they could make to the 
development of the proposed model into a still more complex system. Due to scope 
constraints however, this paper will only brush one last paradigm requiring shifting. “The 
time has come for a different theory of the institutional location and function of complaint agencies. 
One suggestion is to regard them as located within a new fourth branch of government – an 
oversight, review and integrity branch. (...) [Another view places them] as a part of the justice 
system. (...) The challenge for complaint handling bodies is to demonstrate that they are the 
frontline of the justice system.”189  Though the comment specifically concerns public 
administration complaint-handling agencies, its rationale applies more widely.  
Indeed, allocating clear and defined responsibilities to ADR bodies sediments their 
legitimacy, both legally and de facto (for ex., by imposing the publicity of performance-
accounts), and encourages a more efficient use of their competences. This means they are 
given the ability to effectively perform their roles of dispute prevention and resolution, 
while decreasing Court litigation and jurisdictional overlapping.  
It engages a holistic approach to justice: ADR bodies are no longer subsidiary or an 
alternative, but complementary to the judicial system. They permit filtrating disputes 
according to subject relevance and potentially initiate a more proficient dialogue with the 
consumer, set on integrity, accountability and good governance standards. Whichever the 
answer to the previous excerpt, and this paper inclines towards the second view, they don‟t 
have to be mutually exclusive. As pointed, NRAs themselves can have a much more active 
role in ADR dynamics, even if just by contributing to a more effective enforcement of 
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 Ibidem; Menkel-Meadow (2003). 
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 MacMillan (2009), p.5. 
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decisions or of sanctions on delaying practices carried out by the parties within ADR 
proceedings
190
.  
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Statutes of ICP-ANACOM (Autoridade Nacional das Comunicações), approved by Decree-
Law no. 309/2001, of December 7
th
   
ICP-ANACOM Deliberation of 21 Abril 2006 on “The object and manner for availability 
to users of offer and usage conditions on electronic communications services” (“Objecto e 
forma de disponibilização ao público das condições de oferta e de utilização de serviços de 
comunicações electrónicas”) 
ICP-ANACOM Deliberation of 1 September 2005 on “Guidelines on the minimum content 
to include in contracts for the providing of electronic communications services” (“Linhas 
de orientação sobre o conteúdo mínimo a incluir nos contratos para a prestação dos 
serviços de comunicações electrónicas”) 
ICP-ANACOM Regulation no. 46/2005, of 14 June, “Regulation on quality of service” 
(“Regulamento sobre qualidade do serviço”) 
ICP-ANACOM Deliberation of 30 March 2006 on “Parameters of quality of service and 
objectives of performance applicable to Universal Service” (“Parâmetros de qualidade de 
serviço e objectivos de desempenho aplicáveis ao serviço universal”) 
 
Table of UK legislation: 
 
Communications Act 2003 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21/contents  
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Table of German legislation: 
 
Telekommunikationsgesetz vom 22. Juni 2004 (TKG)   
(http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/tkg_2004/gesamt.pdf)  
Schlichtungsordnung gemäß § 47a Abs. 4 des Telekommunikationsgesetzes (SchliO2008) 
(http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/44786/publicationFile/3426/Sch
lichtungsordnung2008ID17039pdf.pdf)  
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Annex 1 
Abreviations 
General: 
ADR …………… Alternative Dispute Resolution 
BEREC ................ Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications 
CSP  ……………. Communications Services Providers 
E-ADR .................. Electronic Alternative Dispute Resolution 
ECS.......................Electronic Communications Services 
EU ……………… European Union 
ICANN..................Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
ICT ........................Information and Communications Technology 
IDR …………….. Internal Dispute Resolution 
ITU........................International Telecommunication Union 
NRA ……………. National Regulatory Authority 
ODR ……………. Online Dispute Resolution 
SchliO2008........... Schlichtungsordnung gemäß § 47a Abs. 4 des  
                               Telekommunikationsgesetzes 
TKG...................... Telekommunikationsgesetz (2004) 
UDRP....................Uniform Dispute-Resolution Policy 
 
National Regulatory Authorities for Communications: 
 
ICP-ANACOM ..  ICP-ANACOM (Autoridade Nacional das Comunicações) (Portugal) 
Ofcom ………….. Office of Communications (UK) 
RegTP .................. Regulierungsbehörde für Telekommunikation und Post (of the 
Bundesnetzagentur/Federal Network Agency for Electricity, Gas, 
Telecommunications, Post and Railway) (Germany) 
  B 
 
Annex 2 
Electronic communications most common complaints by content  
received by ICP-ANACOM – Autoridade Nacional das Comunicações
191
 
 ~ comparative table for 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 ~ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
191
 The table includes only written complaints‟ contents (note that one complaint might report one or more issues falling into one or more content categories; 
hence total values will not coincide with the numbers of received complaints). Data source: http://www.anacom.pt/render.jsp?categoryId=315335 – the data 
regarding each year was collected from the correspondent annual report: table 6 (2006); table d, in Point 1.1.1. (2007); table d, in Point 1.1.1. (2008); table 
2.1.3 (p.18) (2009); table 2.1.2. (p.17) (2010).  
Subtitles:
Solicitation by content
Content 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
1.º Equipament 2,296 3,685 5,549 7,425 7,351
2.º Tecnical support/assistance 1,649 3,419 5,884 6,255 3,137
3.º Client Service 2,489 3,288 5,002 6,316 5,850
4.º Billing 2,188 2,954 4,989 7,495 7,234
5.º Carrier Selection and pre-selection (call-by-call selection) 59 2,803 533 109 80
6.º Initial Supplying / Cancelling of service 1,777 2,772 5,825 7,120 7,368
7.º Mal-functioning / Interruption of Service 1,446 1,826 2,865 4,441 4,646
8.º Contract 1,745 1,714 4,048 5,390 4,960
9.º Tarifs 627 1,054 1,550 2,225 2,893
10.º Suspension of Service 823 909 1,539 2,130 2,075
11.º Internet Speed 331 582 762 1,001 931
12.º Portability 292 475 1,395 1,486 1,154
13.º Unbundling of the local loop / Local loop 633 242 137 57 26
14.º Complaint Book 86 167 226 194 259
15.º Infrastructures 97 149 239 249 250
16.º Geografic "Portability"* n.a. 91 152 141 10
17.º Numbering 12 91 37 41 28
18.º Roaming 39 91 179 176 169
19.º Privacy and Protection of Personal Data 59 82 164 196 243
20.º Phonebook and Information Services 70 55 37 30 40
21.º     Municipal Fee for Rights of Way/TMDP - Municipalities set percentages 3 17 9 8 16
22.º Information and Statistics Requests n.a. 2 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Total 16721 26,468 41,121 52,485 48,720
*Change of address for the providing of land phone services w hile keeping the same phone 
number.   
n.a. - not available
Total
  C 
If any of the parties 
withdraws permission for 
mediation or an 
agreement is not reached 
in 1 month-period: 
adjudicatory ruling.   
  Complaint without previous                              Complaint with previous                        Complaint lacking                     Vexatious/Frivolous                                            
  use of CSP‟s IDR                                                    use of IDR                                     clear information/facts                        Complaint                    
                                                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                           Notification of claimant for clarification 
                                                                                                                                                   of facts 
Notification of claimant to 
address CSP about 
problem; notification of 
claim to CSP. Period of 15 
working-days to resolve 
complaint. Attribution of 
case number to claim for 
reference purposes. 
           
               
 
Notification of parties 
after 15 working-days to 
report if the complaint has 
been solved and, if not, if 
the claimant whishes to 
initiate a dispute 
resolution process. 
 
                         
 
No consensus reached and 
CSP does not request 
more time to deal with 
issue or has deemed it 
deadlocked: opening of 
proceedings. 
   Notification of claim to CSP and request to produce evidence      
                                                            
a) resolution between the parties   –  notification to Body  –  case closure; 
 
b) CSP does not respond:                                no response: adjudication 
                               
    -new notification to produce evidence        resolution between parties       a) 
      within 5 working-days                                      
                                                                         produce of evidence    c) 
c) produce of evidence 
 
    -notification to claimant to rebut          no rebut         adjudication 
                                                      
                                                     rebut         unclear facts/evidence: mediation   
             clear facts/evidence: adjudication              at both parties request 
 
                                                       judicial appeal 
Decision against claimant          possibility of review by the Body: of facts, procedural aspects and merit            
                                                                                                                                
                      Special one-member panelist (appointed by sorting by the Body): 
                       - claimant rebuts decision, identifying points of disagreement; may or may not substantiate 
                       appeal. No possibility of producing new evidence, if obtained prior to initial ruling.                                        
                              
                      New ruling by adjudication: 10 working-days period; if decision is maintained, application of 
                      fee to claimant, unless new and pertinent evidence was introduced. 
Decision against CSP   binding decision; appeal to NRA merely on procedural grounds OR judicial 
appeal.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Preliminary decision  
of dismissal (automated 
reply; system has the 
role of an automated 
dispute resolution tool. 
Link is given to 
informative section at  
the NRA‟s website.) 
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